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Preface
The 2016 presidential election has sparked an unprecedented 
interest in the Electoral College. In response to Donald Trump 
winning the presidency despite losing the popular vote, numer-
ous commentators have weighed in with letters-to-the-editor, op-
eds, blog posts, and the like, and thanks to the revolution in digital 
communications, these items have reached an exceptionally wide 
audience. In short, never before have so many people had so much 
to say about the Electoral College. 
This remains a high-stakes debate, and historians, politi-
cal scientists, philosophers, and other scholars have an important 
role to play in it. They can enrich discussions about the Elector-
al College by situating the system within the history of America 
and other societies; untangling the intricacies of republicanism, 
federalism, and democracy; articulating different concepts of po-
litical morality; and discerning, through statistical analysis, whom 
the Electoral College benefits most. In spotlighting the Electoral 
College from various vantage points, this volume aims to empower 
citizens to make clear-eyed decisions about it.  
If one of this volume’s goals is to illuminate the Electoral 
College, another is to do so while many people are still focused 
on the topic. This project came together quickly. The entire en-
terprise went from conception to completion in a mere five weeks. 
That swiftness was made possible by working with The Digital 
Press at the University of North Dakota, which embraces a coop-
erative, transparent model of publication with the goal of produc-
ing open-access, electronic works that can attract local and global 
audiences. Likewise, this volume came to fruition speedily because 
the contributors agreed to pen brief essays in short order. As a re-
sult, while their works have the hallmarks of scholarly articles, they 
do not constitute an exhaustive examination of the Electoral Col-
lege. Indeed, many germane subjects are not addressed. Even so, 
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these learned ruminations can enhance the ongoing debate about 
the Electoral College.
Essays of this sort are much-needed, for the post-election di-
alogue about the Electoral College has been warped by partisan-
ship. Republicans who reckon that Electoral College benefits their 
party usually have defended the system. Conversely, Democrats, 
smarting from the fact that in a span of sixteen years they have 
twice lost the presidency despite popular vote triumphs, typically 
have denounced it. This mode of assessment is unfortunate, for 
it impairs our ability to analyze the Electoral College on its own 
merits, as opposed to how it affects one party or another. Put an-
other way, the Electoral College is an inherently political institu-
tion, but appraisals of it need not be invariably partisan. 
To facilitate and expand the conversation about the Elector-
al College, this volume offers short essays that examine it from 
different disciplinary perspectives, including philosophy, mathe-
matics, political science, communications, history, and pedagogy. 
Along the way, the essays address a variety of questions about the 
Electoral College: Why was it created? What were its antecedents? 
How has it changed over time? Who benefits from it? Is it just? 
Should we alter or abolish the Electoral College, and if so, what 
should replace it? In exploring these matters, Picking the President 
provides timely insights on one of America’s most high-profile, 
momentous issues. 
Introduction 
A Brief History of the Electoral College
Eric Burin
In 1787, Americans probably had more experience writing con-
stitutions than any people ever. They had adopted the Articles of 
Confederation during the Revolutionary War, and had penned 
thirteen state constitutions, as well. Perhaps for this reason, it’s 
doubtful anyone arrived at the Constitutional Convention think-
ing that the Electoral College was the way to pick a president. 
Instead, the convention’s delegates identified three groups 
that could select the president: Congress, state governments, or 
the people. Some delegates (including, at one point, James Mad-
ison) favored a popular vote, but many representing slave states 
or states with restrictive franchise laws objected. Consequently, a 
good number of attendees championed the congressional option 
(understandably so, since in most states the legislature elected the 
governor). This plan nearly triumphed, but a last-minute attempt 
by South Carolina delegate John Rutledge to privilege the more 
populous states by having the president be picked by a joint ballot 
of the Senate and House, when combined with a lingering desire 
to make the executive branch more independent of its legislative 
counterpart, derailed the proposal. Ultimately, the convention ad-
opted the Electoral College and embedded it in Article II of the 
Constitution. 
Article II is among the most detailed parts of the Constitu-
tion and it can be found in its entirety in this volume’s Documents 
section, but it’s worthwhile to highlight a few key features here: 
Under this system, electoral votes were allotted to each state based 
on the number of Representatives it had in the House, plus its 
two Senators; state legislatures determined how the electors were 
picked; each elector could cast two votes for president; and if a 
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presidential candidate failed to get a majority of electoral votes, the 
House of Representatives, with each state getting one vote, would 
select the president and vice president from among the top five 
electoral vote-getters. Several essays in this volume examine why 
many founders thought this process for picking the president was 
(to paraphrase Alexander Hamilton) if not a perfect system then at 
least an excellent one.
After the Constitution was ratified, the Electoral College 
underwent modifications. These changes were spurred by some-
thing the delegates at the Constitutional Convention hadn’t an-
ticipated—the rise in the early 1790s of two competing political 
parties, the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans. The 
convention delegates originally envisioned the Electoral College 
being comprised of knowledgeable and honorable men who, more 
often than not, would forward to the House a list of commend-
able, broad-minded presidential candidates, each of whom enjoyed 
some regional but not national renown. But the infusion of party 
politics caused the Electoral College to misfire: In 1796, a Dem-
ocratic-Republican, Thomas Jefferson, ended up serving as vice 
president to a Federalist president, John Adams. In 1800, Jeffer-
son and his running mate Aaron Burr received the same number 
of electoral votes, causing a constitutional crisis that nearly led to 
bloodshed. In response, in 1804, the 12th Amendment was adopted, 
the most important feature of which was requiring electors to cast 
separate ballots for the president and vice president. Thereafter, 
presidential contests became more democratic affairs, essentially 
morphing into popular referendums on party platforms and the 
candidates who championed them. 
The advent of partisanship also affected the way states select-
ed presidential electors. Early on, most states invested state legis-
lators with that power. But party leaders soon perceived the advan-
tages of adopting statewide, winner-take-all systems (as a case in 
point, Jefferson’s 1796 defeat could be attributed to three solitary 
Federalist electors who hailed from states that were otherwise in 
the Democratic-Republican camp). By 1820, the number of states 
using the statewide system equaled those still using the legislative 
system. Meanwhile, only a handful of states picked electors by dis-
ix
tricts. This was the method, Madison wrote in 1823, that the con-
vention delegates had had in mind when they adopted the Elec-
toral College, and consequently he called for an amendment that 
would have required states to use the district system. Madison’s 
proposal fell on deaf ears, and by 1836, every state except South 
Carolina had adopted the statewide system. Even so, the sentiment 
in favor of the district method never expired. In 1966, for example, 
Delaware, along with eleven other states (including North Dako-
ta), filed suit against New York, arguing that the latter’s winner-
take-all system effectively disfranchised the less populous states. 
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case, and like that 
ill-fated suit, recent proposals to institute the district method, or 
hybrid systems like those used in Maine and Nebraska, have made 
little headway against entrenched political interests.
The collapse of slavery during the Civil War brought to 
the fore another long-standing political dispute that affected the 
Electoral College: Which residents should be counted when al-
locating House seats? Previously, slaveholding states could count 
three-fifths of their enslaved residents toward their representation 
in the House. With slavery’s demise, newly emancipated African 
Americans, who at this juncture were not permitted to vote, could 
now be counted as five-fifths of a person, meaning white southern-
ers’ political power was poised to increase during the postbellum 
period. The emergence in 1867 of Radical Reconstruction, with its 
commitment to establishing an interracial democracy in the post-
war South, resolved this issue, at least temporarily. The enactment 
of the 14th Amendment in 1868 (which diminished a state’s share 
of House seats proportionally to the extent to which it barred adult 
male citizens from voting) and the 15th Amendment in 1870 (which 
prohibited disfranchisement on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude) effectively granted southern states full rep-
resentation in the House and the Electoral College on the condi-
tion that black men be allowed to vote. By 1900, however, white 
“redeemers” had seized control of southern governments and dis-
franchised nearly all black residents with literacy tests, grandfather 
clauses, and other ostensibly race-neutral mechanisms. As a result, 
southern states could count African Americans when laying claim 
xto House seats and electoral votes, even though such persons en-
joyed virtually no political rights. Many of the redeemers’ meth-
ods were subsequently outlawed, but disputants still debate how 
non-voters (such as legal and illegal immigrants, minors, prisoners, 
and ex-felons) should be counted when distributing House seats 
and—concomitantly—electoral votes. 
The size of the House of Representatives also affects the 
Electoral College. The Constitution provides little guidance on 
the matter, only stipulating that 1) apportionment be based on 
state populations, 2) every state gets at least one Congressperson; 
and 3) each Congressperson represents no less than 30,000 res-
idents. After the 1790 census, Congress passed a bill that called 
for 120 House seats, but President George Washington issued a 
veto—the first veto in U.S. history—with the result being that a 
subsequent law established the number of seats at 105. Thereafter, 
Congress almost always increased the number of House seats to 
keep pace with population growth and the addition of new states 
into the Union (though there were debates as to how exactly those 
seats should be divvied up). In 1911, in customary fashion, Con-
gress enacted another apportionment law, this time creating a 
433-member House (with a provision that one seat each would 
be added for Arizona and New Mexico when they became states). 
Over the next ten years, immigration, migration, and urbanization 
so altered the nation’s demographic landscape that Congressper-
sons who feared that the next reapportionment would diminish 
their states’ political clout managed to prevent such a law from 
being passed after the 1920 census. When Congress finally enacted 
a reapportionment law in 1929, the new statute permanently fixed 
the number of House seats at 435. Then and now, this cap hurts 
the most populous states in the House, and by extension, in the 
Electoral College.
The post-World War II struggle for greater inclusiveness 
in America brought renewed attention to the Electoral College. 
The most instrumental change concerned the 23rd Amendment, a 
measure that allotted electoral votes to the District of Columbia, 
which was home to 763,000 people. The bill passed Congress in 
1960 with considerable bipartisan support, perhaps a reflection of 
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the era’s democratic sensibilities, as well as the fact that it wasn’t 
clear whether Republicans or Democrats would win those addi-
tional electoral votes. Thereafter, the measure quickly secured the 
approval of three-quarters of the states. The District’s participa-
tion in the Electoral College serves as a reminder that many other 
U.S. possessions are not treated similarly: In the 2016 election, 
four million Americans (about as many people living in Wyoming, 
Vermont, Alaska, and North Dakota combined), almost all of them 
citizens, resided in parts of the U.S., such as Puerto Rico, Guam, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands, that were excluded from the Electoral 
College.
That exclusivity, when combined with the Electoral College’s 
inherently undemocratic nature, has produced results that, in the 
estimation of some of the system’s modern critics, are nearly ran-
dom, especially when presidential contests feature evenly matched 
major party candidates and/or strong third-party candidates. For 
example, in the 1968 race, a good showing by American Indepen-
dent Party candidate George Wallace and slim margins of victory 
in key states by Richard Nixon, left many—including Nixon him-
self—dissatisfied with the Electoral College. In response, Congress 
took up the Bayh-Celler Amendment, the most serious challenge 
to the Electoral College to date. This popular vote proposal passed 
the House but died in the Senate at the hands some small states 
and many southern ones, where disfranchised African Americans 
could still be counted when allocating electoral votes. Thereafter, 
Jimmy Carter’s rather contingent and fortuitous victory in 1976 
and Ross Perot’s notable runs as the Reform Party candidate in 
1992 and 1996 inspired additional calls for reform, as did George 
W. Bush’s victory in 2000, in which he won the electoral vote de-
spite losing the popular vote. Similarly, in 2016, Hillary Clinton 
secured over 2.8 million more votes than Donald Trump, but the 
latter triumphed in the Electoral College, thanks to narrow victo-
ries in a handful of swing states. Such quirks have always been a 
part of the Electoral College. But in light of the 24th Amendment 
(which banned the poll tax), the 1965 Voting Rights Act (which es-
tablished federal protections to safeguard access to the ballot box), 
the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the “one person, one vote” 
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principle, and other advances in political egalitarianism, these an-
ti-majoritarian and seemingly unpredictable outcomes are, from 
the perspective of those who decry the system, disturbingly out of 
sync with modern sensibilities. As proof, they note that in no other 
contest do Americans employ anything like the Electoral College.
Even so, those who would alter or abolish the Electoral Col-
lege have a difficult road ahead. Although the system always has 
been subject to dispute, and opinion polls dating back to the 1940s 
have shown most Americans preferring a popular vote for presi-
dent, revising or discarding the Electoral College has proved ex-
ceedingly difficult. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the 
2016 election, the Electoral College became a decidedly parti-
san issue: Republican support for a constitutional amendment in 
favor of a popular vote plummeted to 19%, down from 54% in 
2011. Furthermore, the 2016 election resulted in Republicans con-
trolling not just the presidency, but also both houses of Congress, 
33 governorships, and 68 of 99 state legislative chambers. Given 
these attitudinal and political conditions, it seems almost certain 
that the Electoral College will remain embedded in the Constitu-
tion for the foreseeable future. 
Still, reformers have some cause for optimism. For starters, 
they can point to the incremental progress of the National Pop-
ular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), an arrangement wherein 
participating states pledge to cast their electoral votes to the win-
ner of the national poplar vote, regardless of the outcome in their 
particular state. This proposal, which has the advantage of embrac-
ing rather than resisting each state’s right to determine the means 
by which it selects presidential electors, would go into effect once 
the participating states account for a majority of the 538 elector-
al votes available. As of 2016, ten states, plus the District of Co-
lumbia, had signed on. Collectively, they account for 165 electoral 
votes—61.1% of the 270 needed for the compact to become op-
erational. Those joining the NPVIC thus far have tended to lean 
strongly Democratic, and there are good reasons to believe that 
the compact’s supporters will encounter more resistance in swing 
states (which may be unwilling to forego the outsized influence 
they wield in the Electoral College) and Republican-controlled 
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states (which currently oppose alterations to the system). Never-
theless, history shows that attempts at dealing with the Electoral 
College’s alleged defects have made the most headway when it pro-
duces especially controversial results, and during periods of par-
tisan tumult and realignment. Such appears to be the case today. 
These circumstances, when combined with the American ethos of 
advancement, provide reformers with a glimmer of hope, for as 
Madison remarked about the means by which Americans pick their 
president, “a solid improvement of it is a desideratum that ought to 
be welcomed by all enlightened patriots.”
This volume reflects the notion that professional humanists and 
social scientists have something substantive to offer “enlightened 
patriots.” It is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of the 
Electoral College, nor does it seek to dictate the terms of debate 
about the system. Rather, it aims to add perspectives, arguments, 
and historical evidence. In short, it provides timely, learned re-
sponses to one of the most consequential issues of the day, and as 
such, it endeavors to foster thoughtful, civil discourse among an 
engaged and informed public. 
The essays in Section One put the Electoral College in com-
parative perspective. William Caraher examines how the political 
institutions of ancient Athens and Rome foreshadowed the Elec-
toral College. Donald F. Johnson explores the ways in which the 
Electoral College mimicked the noble-dominated federal monar-
chies of early modern Europe. Manisha Sinha compares the Elec-
toral College to the “rotten borough” system that existed in Brit-
ain until the mid-19th century. Andrew Meyer likens the Electoral 
College to the mechanisms that China adopted to bind together 
that vast and diverse society. These contributions allow us to see 
the Electoral College in a new light by placing it side-by-side with 
comparable political institutions. 
The essays in Section Two investigate how the Electoral 
College has shaped American politics historically. Andrew Shank-
man discusses the ideological assumptions that undergirded the 
creation of the Electoral College, and the political realities that 
prompted the ratification of the 12th Amendment. Patrick Rael 
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surveys how the Electoral College affected southern political pow-
er before and after the Civil War. Cynthia Culver Prescott sit-
uates the Electoral College’s persistence within the larger story 
of America’s halting progress toward equality. Timothy Prescott 
uses statistical analysis to assess the historical relationship between 
the popular vote and the electoral vote. These works permit us to 
view contemporary disputes over the Electoral College against the 
backdrop of the system’s long history. 
Section Three features five essays that debate the merits of 
the Electoral College from different disciplinary viewpoints. Phi-
losopher Jack Russell Weinstein contemplates whether it is just 
to have the electoral vote diverge from the popular vote. Com-
munications professor Mark Trahant points to the rise of the 
digital economy and egalitarian values when calling for reforms 
to the Electoral College and other undemocratic political insti-
tutions. Political scientist Mark Stephen Jendrysik argues that 
the Electoral College is an outdated system, and when it produces 
anti-majoritarian outcomes, it invites a crisis of political legitimacy. 
Another political scientist, Benjamin J. Kassow, warns that any 
alteration to the Electoral College will necessarily entail import-
ant political tradeoffs. Historian Allen Guelzo and lawyer James 
Hulme emphasize federalism’s virtues in defending the Electoral 
College. Like the proverbial blind men describing different parts 
of an elephant, each of these essays provide a distinct perspective 
on the Electoral College. 
In Section Four, Brad Austin reflects on how teaching about 
the historical development of the Electoral College provides an 
opportunity to cultivate empathy in the classroom. In some ways, 
his contribution points toward the Documents section at the end of 
the book. The documents, which are well-known and in the public 
domain, invite readers to think for themselves about origins and 
evolution of the Electoral College in the early American republic. 
Section One
The Electoral College 
in Comparative Perspective

1
Ancient States and Representative Government: 
Greek and Roman Models for the Electoral 
College
William Caraher
The framers of the U.S. Constitution looked to antiquity as an 
inspiration for their own republic. The city-state of Athens during 
its Classical efflorescence represented a model for democracy, but 
it was not nearly as compelling as the Roman Republic alternately 
celebrated by Enlightenment authors and English reformers. Both 
ancient civilizations offered historical precedents for representa-
tive forms of government that allowed the architects of the vari-
ous colonial and state constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, 
and the U.S. Constitution to appeals to traditions of government 
outside and older than the rule of the European aristocracy. Nei-
ther the Athenian democracy in its various forms nor the Roman 
Republic offered an exact precedent for the Electoral College, but 
both recognized the importance of recognizing regional interests 
in the context of their popular institutions.   
Democratic Athens of the 5th century BC, featured a popu-
lar assembly made up of all citizens which generally meant male, 
property owners, of military age. This assembly met in Athens 
to vote on whatever legislation that the state required. Over the 
course of the 7th and 6th centuries BC various institutions served 
the roles of the executive, generally an office called the archon, and 
for a range of different judiciary functions. Most importantly for 
our purpose here, there existed a council responsible for preparing 
the legislation upon which the popular assembly would vote. In 
the late 6th century, the Athenian politician Cleisthenes negotiated 
a series of reforms in Athens including the creation of a “Coun-
2cil of 500” which would serve this function. This council included 
50 representatives from each of ten tribes. Each tribe represented 
communities from each of three non-contiguous regions in Attica, 
the territory ruled by the city of Athens: the city, the coast, and 
the interior. The goal of this arrangement was to ensure that each 
region had representation in the Council of 500 and played a role 
in the preparation of legislation for the popular assembly (whether 
this is how this arrangement functioned in practice remains dif-
ficult to know). The organization of the Council of 500 around 
territorially diverse tribes provided an important, representative, 
counterweight to the popular assembly which tended to be biased 
toward citizens resident in Athens or who could afford time away 
from their field, businesses, or jobs to attend voting sessions. In 
this effort to balance regional concerns with the direct democracy 
of the assembly, Athens provides an early example of a representa-
tive council in the Western tradition. While the tribal basis for the 
Council of 500 did not ensure each region distinct representation 
within the Athenian government, it appears to have acknowledged 
the diverse regional interests present in the Athenian state and it 
recognized, at least in theory, that compensating for regional in-
terests served as a kind of counterweight to the popular assembly. 
Whatever the innovation present in democratic Athens, the 
Roman Republic provided a far more compelling and influential 
model for the framers of the U.S. Constitution. Rome, like Ath-
ens, did not have a written constitution to guide its governmental 
structure, but we know enough about how it functioned from his-
torians in antiquity. The Roman Republic possessed an array of as-
semblies and councils each with specific functions and advantages 
to particular groups. Unlike Athens, there was far less emphasis 
on the democratic, popular assembly and a fundamental commit-
ment to the republican practice of voting blocks which represented 
groups of citizens within Roman society. The two most significant 
of these councils were the comitia centuriata and the comitia tributa. 
In the comitia centuriata, Roman citizens were grouped into first 
193 and then 373 centuries according to wealth. Each century was 
a voting block and the majority of voters within the century de-
cided the vote of that century. The wealthiest citizens were divid-
3ed into more centuries than the poorest giving them more voting 
blocks. Moreover, the wealthiest centuries voted first resulting in 
most elections being decided long before the poorest blocks voted, 
although reformers consistently tried to shift the balance toward 
the poorest voters.
The poorest voters tended to congregate in the city of Rome, 
and this marginalized their political influence in other major as-
sembly, the comitia tributa, which was organized according to re-
gion of residence. The city of Rome consisted of four urban tribes 
whereas the surrounding regions, eventually expanded to include 
all of Italy, comprised an additional 31. Each of the 35 tribes had a 
single vote with the 31 rural tribes tending to represent the inter-
ests of wealthier, rural landowners. Like in the comitia centuriata, 
the majority of tribes carried decisions in this assembly. In fact, the 
politically marginal character of the urban tribes was such that a 
punishment for certain kind of crimes included moving the guilty 
individual’s tribal affiliation from a rural to an urban tribe to af-
fect a kind of political disenfranchisement. Like in Athens, regional 
concerns play a role in managing the political balance of the Ro-
man Republic. 
While neither the representative council in Cleisthenic Ath-
ens or the comitia tributa in republican Rome represented a pre-
cise analog to the Electoral College, the Electoral College and 
the Roman assemblies shared the concept of voting blocks that is, 
in some appraisals, central to the idea of republican governance. 
For Rome, the comitia tributa also allowed for the state to expand 
voting and citizen rights into newly conquered territories while 
maintaining the privileges of the traditional aristocracy through 
their control of the majority of tribes. While this may appear to be 
a regressive tactic designed to conserve the political power of the 
traditional Roman elite, it also allowed the Roman state to expand 
political rights to new populations in ways that would have been 
more politically risky for a direct democracy like in Athens. By 
slotting new citizens into existing tribes or sequestering them into 
a small number of tribes, the Roman elite also ensured the stability 
of the state even during times of expansion.
4Today, political commentators like to look to Rome and Ath-
ens to predict or make sense of the American political trajectory. 
This makes sense, of course, because the challenges faced by the 
Roman Republic and the democracy of Athens allow for sensa-
tionally tragic presentations of our country’s political fate set amid 
the fundamental conservatism of the republican political tradition. 
Whether the U.S. will fail because of this adherence to these out-
moded republican practices or find within them stability during 
times of dynamic change is beyond the limited gaze of the histo-
rian’s craft.
2
The Electoral College as American Aristocracy
Donald F. Johnson
Although dedicated to creating a republic, for the framers of the 
United States Constitution a stable aristocracy was essential to the 
project of crafting a Federal state. Basing their ideas on enlight-
enment theory and the British constitutional tradition, Constitu-
tional architects such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton 
envisioned a strong, independent class of well-educated, wealthy, 
independent men, who could mimic the function of European 
nobility and act as a check on potentially tyrannical executives or 
overly populist legislative assemblies. The Senate, meant to be a 
republican version of the British House of Lords, was perhaps the 
most obvious attempt at enshrining the interests of these wealthy 
men in government at the national level. The Electoral College, 
however, was crucial in creating a functioning local aristocracy 
in America. And, unlike the Senate, it is one that has never been 
democratized, maintaining to this day its connections to the mo-
narchial governments of early modern Europe upon which it was 
based.1
Indeed, if the Senate was meant to establish a national aris-
tocracy, the framers intended for the Electoral College to maintain 
elite representation at the state and local levels. The Constitution 
prescribed no form of selection for state electors, and did not bind 
1  On the importance of mixed government for the framers, see James 
Madison, Federalist No. 40 and Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Nos. 
23-28. For their Enlightenment inspiration, see Locke, Two Treatises on 
Government (1689) and Montesquieu, On the Spirit of the Laws (1748). 
On the Senate as safely fulfilling the aristocratic function in a mixed 
republican government, see Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John 
Jay, Federalist Nos. 62-66.
6them to follow popular elections for president in any way. As the 
Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 68 demonstrates, the College 
was meant to be a check on the excesses of the people, comprised 
of wealthy men “free from any sinister bias” who would protect 
the presidency from falling into the hands of “any man who is not 
in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.” 
Hamilton, Madison, and other Federalists assumed that state-level 
elites would act as a further check on the powers of the people 
and of demagogues who might seduce them. Still, such a blatantly 
un-representative feature seems out-of-place in a representative 
form of government.2
This dissonance is because the Electoral College was based 
not on republican theory but on the structure of aristocratic elec-
tive monarchies in eighteenth-century Europe, most notably the 
Dutch Republic, the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, and 
the Holy Roman Empire. In the Netherlands, representatives 
from seven feudal provinces, each administered independently 
by hereditary lords, gathered periodically to elect a stadholder, 
or steward, responsible for leading the Dutch army in wartime, 
administering foreign affairs, and resolving conflicts between the 
provinces. Typically, stadholders came from the House of Orange, 
which became the de-facto royal family of the Netherlands (and 
whose most prominent member, William III, ascended the throne 
of Great Britain in 1688). Nevertheless, through the electoral 
system nobles of each province maintained autonomy over their 
provinces.
In early modern Poland-Lithuania, nobles came together 
from tens of thousands of sovereign fiefs to elect new monarchs 
upon the death of a prior king. Meeting in the sjem, or noble Par-
liament, these aristocrats tended to elect members of prominent 
families from among their own ranks, though elections could be 
bitterly disputed and more than once led to schisms and civil wars. 
Still, as in the Dutch Republic, the sjem ensured that nobles main-
tained power within their domains, and exercised supervisory au-
thority over their executive.
2  For the selection of electors, see the United States Constitution, Arti-
cle II, Section 1. For Hamilton’s analysis, see Hamilton, Federalist No. 68 
in the Documents section.
7Finally, the Holy Roman Empire comprised perhaps the old-
est and most well-known electoral college. For almost a thousand 
years, seven to ten electors of various German and Italian states 
comprising the Empire met periodically to elect a new Emperor, 
who usually came from the Hapsburg dynasty of Austria. Despite 
its seeming stability, however, electoral politics in the Empire were 
fraught with religious and political intrigue, and prince-electors 
(of whom George III of Great Britain, in his dual capacity as ruler 
of Hanover, was one) exercised near total autonomy over their own 
domains.3
The American Electoral College thus resembles more closely 
those of noble-dominated Federal monarchies of late-eighteenth 
century Europe than the British-style mixed constitution from 
which the framers drew much of their inspiration. electors, drawn 
from the elites of each state in the Union, would confirm not only 
the integrity of the Presidency but also maintain the power of the 
local aristocracies in each region of the country. Yet, while the elec-
toral systems of the Netherlands, Poland, and the Holy Roman 
Empire were destroyed in Revolutionary fervor during the 1790s 
and 1800s, the American Electoral College persists in much the 
same form established in 1789.
Indeed, the Electoral College continues to perpetuate a 
regional American aristocracy. Unlike the Senate, which was re-
formed in 1913 to allow for direct elections, electors are still ap-
pointed by state legislatures and governors, and typically comprise 
local elites. 2016 electors for the state of New York, for example, 
included former President Bill Clinton, current governor Andrew 
Cuomo, and current New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio.4 Given 
its noble origins in pre-Revolutionary Europe and recent dramat-
ic splits between the electoral and popular votes, perhaps further 
consideration of its place in modern American society is in order.
3  For more on the composition of the Holy Roman Empire, Poland, and 
the Netherlands in the early modern period, see Thomas Ertman, Birth 
of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe (Cambridge, 1997).
4  “Duly Appointed Presidential Electors.” The Green Papers: 2016 Gen-
eral Election, accessed December 27th, 2016; http://www.thegreenpapers.
com/G16/EC-Electors.phtml.
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America’s Rotten Electoral College System
Manisha Sinha
Something stinks about the recent presidential election. It ema-
nates from the country’s rotten Electoral College system for se-
lecting the president of the United States. I use the term rotten 
advisedly. America’s Electoral College in the twenty-first century 
resembles Britain’s “rotten borough” system of electing members 
of Parliament in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Not only 
was the franchise restricted to an elite but “rotten boroughs” with 
very few voters could elect representatives to Parliament like the 
far more populous industrializing urban centers. With the Great 
Reform Acts of 1832 and of the 1860s, Britain adopted univer-
sal manhood suffrage and did away with rotten boroughs. But the 
United States persists in retaining its undemocratic and clunky 
Electoral College.
When the framers of the Constitution devised the office of 
the presidency as a republican stand-in for the British monarch 
and indirect presidential elections through an Electoral College, 
they did so as a check on democracy. Each state was rewarded the 
same number of electoral votes as their congressional delegation, 
giving small states that had equal number of senators as larger 
states and slaveholding states that received greater representa-
tion in the House of Representatives because of the three-fifths 
clause, greater electoral weight in the presidential elections. The 
anti-democratic nature of selecting the president was amplified by 
most states, which initially had their legislatures rather than their 
voters select presidential electors. With the spread of Jacksonian 
democracy, adult white men got the right to vote for presidential 
electors except for one hold out, South Carolina until the Civil 
War. 
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Constitutional purists who want to retain the Electoral Col-
lege must recall that American democracy has progressed through 
constitutional amendments. The blueprint for presidential elec-
tions has proven to be one of the Constitution’s most inefficient 
sections. One of the earliest constitutional amendments, the 12th, 
clarified that electoral votes for the presidency and vice presiden-
cy must be distinct. The demise of slavery mandated by the 13th 
amendment, and with it the three-fifths clause that gave slave-
holders such a powerful say in government, made political repre-
sentation in the United States more equitable. The expansion of 
suffrage for African Americans and women through constitutional 
amendments, the 14th, 15th, and 19th amendments and the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 were important milestones in the growth of 
American democracy. 
The cumbersome Electoral College however has remained 
in place, partly because its undemocratic nature has not been so 
egregiously showcased as in the recent presidential elections. Be-
fore 2016, only four times in American history has the winner of 
the popular presidential vote not won the Electoral College. The 
most recent instance until this year was the contested Gore-Bush 
presidential elections of 2000. But this year, the candidate who 
lost the Electoral College, Hillary Clinton, won the popular vote 
overwhelmingly, by nearly three million votes, the largest margin 
ever for the loser of the Electoral College. These results discredit 
the Electoral College system that weights voters in certain areas 
more than others and makes many of the states in the heartland 
and the South the “rotten boroughs” of today. It calls into question 
the democratic legitimacy of the presidential elections. Over two 
hundred years ago, American patriots rejected “virtual represen-
tation” in the British Parliament for self-government. That ten-
uous experiment in republican government has survived only by 
expanding the boundaries of democracy. It is high time then that 
we got rid of the rotten borough Electoral College system of elect-
ing presidents of the United States.  
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The South (or the North, or the West...) 
Will Rise Again, and Again, and Again: 
Viewing the Electoral College from the 
Perspective of Chinese History*
Andrew Meyer
On July 20, 1842, during the Opium War, British soldiers and war-
ships captured the garrison town of Zhenjiang, at the juncture of 
the Yangzi River and the Grand Canal in the Qing Empire’s Jiang-
su Province. When news reached the Daoguang Emperor (r. 1821-
1850) in Beijing, he authorized his emissaries to treat for peace. 
Though Qing resistance up to that point had been robust, the cap-
ture of Zhenjiang gave the British control of a fatal fracture point 
in the larger imperial edifice.
With the Grand Canal blocked, little tax revenue could flow 
from the southern reaches of the empire to the capital. Two-thirds 
of the population of the Qing empire lived south of the Yangzi, and 
the economic disparity south-to-north was even greater than the 
demographic one. The per capita GDP of the agriculturally and 
commercially rich southern Jiangnan region was nearly twice that 
of more arid, sparsely populated northern districts like Qinghai and 
Gansu. The revenue system of the Qing, which drew tax receipts 
into the capital on the North China Plain, served as a wealth-trans-
fer mechanism from the wealthy south to the impoverished north. 
Disrupting that flow for any length of time could cause the precar-
ious social contract holding the empire together to unravel.
* A version of this essay appeared as Andrew Meyer, “The South (or the 
North, or the West...) Will Rise Again, and Again, and Again: Viewing 
the Electoral College from the Perspective of Chinese History,” Mad-
man of Chu (blog), November 22, 2016, http://madmanofchu.blogspot.
com/2016/11/the-south-or-north-or-west-will-rise.html
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In the wake of the Opium War the worst fears of the Qing 
government were realized. In Guangzhou (Canton) in 1837, the 
young scion of a southern gentry family, Hong Xiuquan (1814-
1864) had for the second time sat for and failed the imperial exams 
that were the surest route to political, economic and social success. 
The pass rates on the exams were extraordinarily low throughout 
the empire, but the odds were made even worse for southerners 
like Hong by the imposition of quotas favoring candidates from 
disadvantaged northern regions. His rage and frustration at this 
second failure induced a nervous collapse: he fell into a feverish 
state in which he had prophetic visions. After the Opium War he 
came to understand these visions as a divine calling and began to 
gather followers. The movement that he began eventually threw 
the Qing Empire into civil war, with large parts of southern China 
breaking away to form the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom from 1850 
to 1864. Unity was only restored after conflict that left as many as 
20 million people dead and the economy of the empire shattered.
The Taiping Rebellion is only one (though admittedly among 
the worst)  of the many instances of cataclysmic breakdown expe-
rienced within the Chinese empire over the 2+ millennia of its his-
tory that were, in part, induced by inter-regional tensions and con-
flicts. Successive imperial regimes struggled to hold together an 
expansive domain throughout which social and economic capital 
was unevenly distributed. Though Chinese leaders developed and 
maintained redistributive mechanisms to offset regional disparities 
(for example, the quotas favoring northern candidates in the impe-
rial exams), these were not generally elastic and responsive enough 
to relieve the persistent centrifugal forces driving the component 
regions of the empire apart. The problem, moreover, remains an 
urgent concern today, as attested by the recent unrest over Bei-
jing’s refusal to allow two secessionist legislators to be sworn in as 
members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council.
This history poses lessons for those of us contemplating the 
issue of the Electoral College in the wake of the 2016 election. Not 
only has the Electoral College subverted the results of the popular 
vote for the second time in less than twenty years, but the 2016 
race has yielded an unprecedented disparity between popular and 
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electoral vote outcomes. Hillary Clinton won the popular vote by 
2.86 million votes (a 2.1% lead) and lost the Electoral College by 
74 votes (a 23% deficit). That the relative differential between the 
two vote tallies should be so wide understandably creates a sense 
of profound unfairness—the impression that the democratic will of 
the people has been effaced by an arcane institution.
Though there will be renewed calls for the abolition of the 
Electoral College, the historical experience of China should give 
us pause to wonder at the wisdom of such a course. Like China, the 
United States is a vast and diverse domain in which social and eco-
nomic capital are unevenly distributed and the interests of differ-
ent groups vary widely from region to region. The 2016 election 
has starkly highlighted the regional tensions straining our social 
fabric, with voters in the industrial Midwest and rural Appalachia 
mobilizing to deliver an electoral result that radically undermined 
conventional expectations. Donald Trump would not have won 
this election unless poor- and working-class voters in states like 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, North Carolina and Wisconsin had 
defected from the Democratic Party in favor of his disruptive cam-
paign, and that movement would not have resulted in a Trump 
victory absent the auspices of the Electoral College.
This being the case, as predictably as there is and will remain 
pressure to dismantle the Electoral College, there will be strong 
resistance to any campaign in this direction. To understand why, 
it is useful to contemplate what a presidential campaign would 
look like if such contests were decided purely by the popular vote. 
Candidates would focus almost entirely on the densely populat-
ed coasts to the exclusion of the interior, and on urban centers 
to the exclusion of more sparsely settled rural districts. By giving 
disproportionate leverage to more rural and sparsely populated 
states, the Electoral College forces candidates to wage truly na-
tional campaigns and to float policies that can win the votes of 
more marginalized citizens.
The 2016 election provides an object lesson in these redistrib-
utive dynamics. Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in California 
by 4.26 million votes. Thus if one eliminates California’s total from 
the national tally, Donald Trump wins the national popular vote 
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by 1.4 million votes. This is a reflection of the fact that the Elec-
toral College weights the popular vote of smaller and less densely 
populated states heavily, such that a vote cast in West Virginia is 
worth three times that of a vote cast in California. While that dis-
parity might seem strangely arbitrary, to citizens in West Virginia, 
which has a per capita GDP of $38,567, it no doubt feels very fair 
that their votes should count more than those of their compatriots 
in California, who enjoy a per capita GDP of $61,924. In light 
of these facts we can see that in the 2016 election, the system as 
currently constituted has (or at least will be perceived as having) 
delivered a shocking victory to rural and industrial working-class 
voters over coastal elites; one that they would never have achieved 
in the absence of the Electoral College. For this reason, any move 
to eliminate this institution will be perceived as an attempt at the 
kind of “rigging” so loudly decried by the more acrimonious rhet-
oric of the recent campaign.
As votes continue to be counted and Hillary Clinton’s lead 
in the popular vote widens, anger at the mechanics of the Elec-
toral College will no doubt increase. In contemplating the situa-
tion, however, we must clearly understand that the elimination of 
the Electoral College cannot be taken for granted as an obvious 
“fix” to a quaintly arcane and obsolete institution. Reversion to 
the popular vote to decide presidential elections is and would be 
a drastically radical change to our larger social contract, one that 
materially impacts the interests of millions of citizens and signifi-
cantly redistributes power across the political terrain. There are 
good philosophical arguments to be made against the “unfairness” 
of the Electoral College, but the historical experience of China 
demonstrates that there are likewise good practical and even ethi-
cal arguments on the other side of the issue. We must acknowledge 
and account for all of the consequences of changing the current 
system as we debate the issue moving forward, and undertake any 
such discussion in a spirit of extreme sensitivity to the interests of 
all groups that would be affected by any reform.
Section Two
The Electoral College 
in Historical Perspective
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What the Founders Were Thinking: 
Why We have the Electoral College* 
Andrew Shankman
Never in our lifetimes has the Electoral College commanded so 
much attention. In arguing about what the Founders’ original in-
tent was in creating it, and whether electors would defect from 
their state’s popular vote, supporters and opponents of Donald 
Trump have shown little knowledge of the Electoral College’s his-
tory. Both sides do not understand that the Founders’ Electoral 
College quickly became a source of chaos, causing the nation to 
abandon it fifteen years after ratifying the Constitution. The sec-
ond version of the Electoral College that replaced the first in 1804 
solved a destructive problem, but created a new and likely fatal one 
that we have lived with ever since. Now that the electoral vote has 
diverged from the popular vote in 40% of the elections conducted 
during the twenty-first century, the problem is nearing a crisis. We 
need a clearer understanding of the origins and history of the Elec-
toral College to understand why it is contributing to our current 
bitter division—and what we should do about it.
 Created by the Constitution, the original Electoral College 
worked like this: each state appointed electors equal to its number 
of senators (2) plus representatives, apportioned at a ratio of 1 for 
every 30,000 residents. Each elector cast two votes for president 
and at least one of those votes had to be for someone outside the 
elector’s state. If someone received the most votes and a majori-
*  A version of this essay appeared as Andrew Shankman, “What Were 
the Founders Thinking When They Created the Electoral College?” 
History News Network, November 28, 2016, http://historynewsnetwork.
org/article/164514
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ty, he became president. The second highest vote-getter became 
vice president. If no one received a majority, the decision went to 
the House of Representatives, which could choose the president 
from among the top five vote-getters, and had to make the highest 
vote-getter vice president if they chose not to make him president. 
To us these original procedures may sound insane; in 2016, they 
would make majority vote-getter Donald Trump president and 
Hillary Clinton vice president. 
So, what were the Founders thinking? The Founders were 
inspired by the classical republics of Greece and Rome and be-
lieved they had collapsed when they stopped seeking the public 
good as their citizens divided into parties to pursue their own in-
terests. For the Founders the public good emerged from a coherent 
set of values, and understanding how to achieve it required a deep 
knowledge of the classics, of natural law, common law, and the law 
of nations, and of the new science of political economy that arose 
during the Enlightenment. Above all, one had to possess disinter-
ested virtue--putting aside personal interests for the sake of the 
public good. The Founders thought that most citizens were not 
capable of fully comprehending the public good. For the United 
States to succeed, the small group of great and talented men who 
could would have to guide them. Believing in a unifying singular 
public good, the Founders saw no value in political parties. Parties 
existed to promote competing interests, which was contrary to the 
public good. Citizens either embraced the public good or they be-
haved selfishly and badly.
 Only by starting with these assumptions did the Electoral 
College make sense. After George Washington’s presidency, the 
Founders assumed their Electoral College would routinely place 
the decision of who would be president with the House of Repre-
sentatives. They reasoned that the small group capable of compre-
hending the public good was evenly distributed geographically. A 
reasonable number of them would stand for election. Each would 
be equally qualified virtuous gentlemen. Without political parties 
to inflame passions and mobilize voters into a few large groups, 
only rarely would a candidate gain majority support in the Elec-
toral College. The Electoral College would helpfully sort out five 
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from the larger group of the equally qualified, but usually would do 
little more than that.  
Yet almost immediately after ratification of the Constitution, 
reality obliterated the Founders’ plan. Bitter divisions over Ham-
ilton’s financial system and the French Revolution showed that 
Americans violently disagreed with each other. By 1796 two po-
litical parties had formed to support or oppose the current course 
of the nation’s domestic and foreign policies and to compete for 
the presidency. Divided Founders became adversarial party lead-
ers. With large regional, even national, voting blocks, it was sud-
denly highly likely that the leader of one of the two parties would 
gain a majority in the Electoral College. The Electoral College 
would now do what the Founders never imagined it should rou-
tinely do—determine the presidency. And the new president’s most 
powerful critic, the leader of the opposition party, would likely get 
the second most electoral votes, become the vice president, and 
bring bitter partisan rancor into the heart of the executive branch. 
This bizarre outcome happened in 1796 when Federalist John Ad-
ams was elected president due to receiving the majority of electoral 
votes, and his opponent, Democratic-Republican Thomas Jeffer-
son, became vice president. In 1800 Jefferson’s electors were so 
disciplined that they cast each of their two votes for him and for 
Aaron Burr, who they planned to make vice president. The result 
was that both received the same number of votes while finishing 
ahead of their Federalist opponents, leading to a prolonged con-
stitutional crisis during which Pennsylvania’s Governor contem-
plated marching his state militia to Washington D.C. to prevent 
anyone other than Jefferson from being inaugurated. 
 By 1800 democracy and political parties had made the 
Electoral College an instrument of chaos. It led in 1804 to pas-
sage of the Twelfth Amendment, which required that electors stip-
ulate a vote for president and for vice president. In abandoning the 
Founders’ vision for the Electoral College, Americans were admit-
ting that they did not live in the sort of republic where the Found-
ers’ Electoral College made sense: one where virtuous gentlemen 
pursued the singular unifying public good about which they all 
agreed. In altering the Electoral College as they did, Americans of 
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the early nineteenth century left us a hybrid and confused version 
of the original. Requiring electors to vote for a president and a 
vice president on a single ticket was a concession that party po-
litical conflict was never going away. Yet though political parties 
and democratic conflict were now acknowledged to be the driving 
force in American politics—that getting the most votes was what 
mattered—those parties would simply have to trust to luck that 
their votes were distributed in just the right way to gain an elector-
al majority. 
Over time the Electoral College has become increasingly 
dysfunctional. As the nation’s population grew, in the twentieth 
century we limited the number of representatives to 435 to pre-
vent the House of Representatives from becoming absurdly large. 
The total number of electoral votes is capped at 538 (senators plus 
representatives plus three votes for the District of Columbia) and 
153 are distributed away immediately since all states must have a 
minimum of three. The remaining 385 are distributed by popu-
lation, which grows ever more distorting as the 385 total remains 
constant while the population grows. In 2014 California’s popula-
tion amounted to 66 Wyomings. Wyoming has three electors and 
California 55. But to ensure that a vote from California counted as 
much as one from Wyoming, California would need 199.
The hybridized confusion has led to our current schizophre-
nia. Trump supporters demanded that electors obey the popular 
vote within their states. At the state level the popular vote must 
be respected so that at the national level the popular vote can be 
ignored. This selective devotion to the popular vote is a legacy of 
the confusion that resulted when the Founders created an institu-
tion that made sense only for conditions that it quickly turned out 
did not exist. In 1803 Americans merged the Electoral College, 
an institution that only made sense in a world without partisan-
ship and organized political parties, with a political process and 
a political culture based on partisan conflict organized by politi-
cal parties. Rather than allow chronic chaos in their Republic, the 
Americans of 1803 abandoned the Founders’ Electoral College. To 
avoid chronic chaos in our Republic, we must abandon the Elec-
toral College entirely. 
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Did Disenfranchisement Give the South an 
Electoral Advantage?*
Patrick Rael
There has been much recent discussion of the three-fifths clause 
of the Constitution,1 which boosted slaveholding states’ represen-
tation in the Electoral College by including for apportionment a 
population that received no benefits from government. Scholars 
have debated how this influenced national politics under slavery, 
but this conversation applies to the post-emancipation world as 
well.2 
Let us start in 1860. With the three-fifths clause operating, 
the slaveholding states controlled 120 of 303 electoral votes (EV), 
or 40%. The free states desired a “0/5” scenario, in which slave-
holding states received no representation benefit for the enslaved 
population. In this case, the South would have controlled only 
35% of all EV. In 1860, the three-fifths clause thus gave the South 
a substantial 5% bump.3
* A version of this essay appeared as Patrick Rael, “Did Disenfran-
chisement Give the South an Electoral Advantage?” Journal of the Civil 
War Era (blog), December 13, 2016, http://journalofthecivilwarera.
org/2016/12/disenfranchisement-give-south-electoral-advantage/.
1 For a brief summary see: Wikipedia contributors, “Three-Fifths Com-
promise,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Accessed December 31, 2016. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Three-Fifths_Compro-
mise&oldid=754867751.
2  See, for example, “Slavery, Democracy, and the Racialized Roots of the 
Electoral College,” AAIHS (November 14, 2016); “Is slavery the reason 
for the Electoral College?” CNN.com (November 22, 2016); “Yes, The 
Electoral College Really Is A Vestige Of Slavery. It’s Time To Get Rid 
Of It.” WGBH News (December 6, 2016).
3  All figures based on my analysis of data from Historical Statistics of the 
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Under the South’s desired “5/5” scenario — the one in which 
all slaves counted for representation — the South would have con-
trolled 42% of all EV. That is a more modest bump of 2% (about 7 
EV) over what it actually enjoyed under the 3/5 ratio. 
Emancipation enhanced the South’s share of national pow-
er by propelling 3.9 million former slaves into the ranks of the 
population used as a basis for apportionment. With slavery gone, 
each former bondsperson would now be counted as a whole person 
rather than three-fifths of one. In principle, this was a “5/5” sce-
nario, in which all people (former slaves among them) were con-
sidered for purposes of representation. 
In the 1872 election cycle, which was the first to rely on 
post-emancipation census figures, the South controlled 138 of 366 
(38%) EV. Had former slaves not been included (a “0/5” scenario), 
the South would have controlled only 90 of 319 (29%) EV. The 
emancipated freedpeople thus gave the South a 9% bump in rep-
resentation in the Electoral College. 
It was good that emancipation boosted southern politi-
cal power so long as those added to the apportionment popula-
tion had access to the political process through the 14th and 15th 
Amendments, which granted citizenship to African Americans, and 
the franchise to black men. But under conditions of complete dis-
franchisement, which southern states came close to making around 
the turn of the 20th century, no African Americans received direct 
representation in Congress.4 At that point, emancipation’s boost in 
United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, Susan B. 
Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, 
Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright, eds. (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006); “Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social 
Research. Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: the 
United States, 1790-1970 (ICPSR 3),” [Computer file] (Ann Arbor, MI: 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 197?). 
A note of caution: there are many ways of building counterfactual sce-
narios with these numbers. I have made some plausible but not airtight 
assumptions, such as that the apportionment basis for each cycle would 
not change despite having fewer people in the apportionment popula-
tion. Bottom line: republish these numbers at your own risk.
4  Absolute disfranchisement was the goal, but it was rarely complete. 
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Southern power worked (some might say ironically) against Afri-
can Americans, who struggled against racist state regimes whose 
disproportionate strength in national government blacks’ presence 
was artificially inflating. Imagine trying to get federal anti-lynch-
ing legislation passed against Southern states that had worked to 
remove blacks from the voting population, and were stronger than 
they should’ve been because of it.
By 1900, African Americans were being largely expelled from 
the political process. Their concerns went unrepresented, and yet 
their numbers still boosted Southern representation in the Elec-
toral College. Effectively, the country ran on the “5/5” principle 
even though the reality was that close to “0/5” of blacks could vote 
for their own representatives. 
In slavery, this desire had resulted in the diminishment of 
Southern power. At the constitutional convention in 1787, repre-
sentatives from northern states had bargained the South down to 
counting only three-fifths of each slave for representation. After 
the war, Republicans had sought to carry this principle into free-
dom by Section 2 of the 14th Amendment, which provided for the 
diminishment of a state’s enumerated population in proportion to 
the proportion of voters it disenfranchised. That failed, though, as 
did the 15th Amendment’s voting protections, when the Supreme 
Court began (from the 1870s on) permitting ostensibly race-neu-
tral but intentionally race-specific disfranchisement measures. This 
gave white supremacists the best of both worlds — they received 
the enhanced political power that went with a larger population, 
without the obligation to serve that population.
The numbers for 1900 bear this out. In the “5/5” reality, 
the states that had held slaves in 1860 (“the South”) had 159 EV, 
or 35% of the total. Under a “0/5” scenario, in which the South 
would lose representation for the blacks it refused to enfranchise, 
the South would have had only 112 EV, or 28% of a smaller House. 
The South thus gained a lot from disenfranchisement. At the 
turn of the century, its largely disenfranchised African Americans 
gave it a 7% bump in the Electoral College, which was one even 
I make no claims here about how many were actually disenfranchised. 
This is about hypothetical extremes.
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larger than the 4-5% bump the three-fifths clause usually gave un-
der slavery. And, as before the war, this was a population included 
only to boost representation, for it could make virtually no claim 
on the political process at all. 
The Electoral College has always provided the ruleset for 
selecting the President of the United States. The framers of the 
Constitution hoped that this membrane between the voters and 
the office of President would insulate the electoral process from 
the “heats and ferments” of public opinion, as Alexander Hamil-
ton put it in Federalist No. 68.5 But the cost has been high, for 
anti-democratic politicians have always been willing to game the 
system. One might have thought that ending slavery would have 
ended the compromise embodied in the three-fifths clause — a 
system that John Quincy Adams came to call “morally and polit-
ically vicious.”6 It was not to be. Of the many paradoxes to the 
5  James Madison, Federalist No.68, see the Documents section.
6  Josiah Quincy, Memoir of the Life of John Quincy Adams (Boston: Crosby, Nich-
ols, Lee and Co., 1860), 108-9.
Information from Susan B. Carter et al., eds., Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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“freedom” that followed slavery, one of the most neglected may be 
this: in the era of Jim Crow, ending slavery only made the white 
South stronger. 

7
Citizenship, Civil Rights, and Electoral Politics
Cynthia Culver Prescott
The United States is a democratic meritocracy. Or so we like to 
believe. While the general trajectory has been toward greater po-
litical and social equality, progress has been uneven. Government 
policies have made the American dream open to many, while dis-
advantaging or deliberately excluding others. The American West 
has long been imagined as land of rugged egalitarianism, but white 
settlement actually exacerbated inequality in important ways. Al-
though the U.S. has had an egalitarian streak since its founding, 
Americans have also deep reservations about sharing power equita-
bly. This enduring tension between egalitarianism and deep-seated 
distrust of the American people may help explain the resilience of 
the remarkably undemocratic Electoral College.
In the decades following our nation’s founding, many people 
residing within the boundaries of the United States did not qualify 
as citizens entrusted with the vote. Property laws and poll taxes en-
sured that only the worthiest – read: wealthiest and whitest – men 
could vote. white women were counted for representation purpos-
es in the legislature and the Electoral College, but they could not 
vote. Under coverture, married women’s legal personhood was ab-
sorbed by her husband. Native Americans and African Americans, 
among others, enjoyed few rights. And, of course, slaves were only 
counted as three-fifths of a person for representation purposes, and 
were treated as chattel rather than as citizens with political rights.
Over the past two hundred years, our nation has expanded 
the privileges of citizenship to more and more Americans. Afri-
can Americans gained citizenship in 1868 and Native Americans in 
1924. Women gained the right to vote in 1920. African American 
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suffrage was enshrined in the Constitution in 1870; nearly a cen-
tury later, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 removed legal barriers 
against Blacks exercising the franchise. We have made our repre-
sentative democracy more direct over the past two centuries, par-
ticularly through the direct election of senators (1913). Initiative, 
referendum and recall powers were also introduced in many states 
during the early twentieth century.
Viewed in this context of expanding political rights and 
greater power for American voters, the Electoral College system 
appears anachronistic. But our nation’s path toward inclusivity has 
not been as smooth, nor our inclusivity as complete, as we like to 
believe.
During the nineteenth century, American women steadi-
ly gained political and economic rights. But when women were 
granted suffrage or married women the right to own property sep-
arate from their husbands, those gains were often motivated not by 
a belief in women’s equality, but out of male self-interest. Granting 
women rights became a means to strengthen a particular group’s 
political influence, or to protect familial property. And only na-
tive-born white women benefitted from many of these privileges.
Following the Civil War, Radical Republicans sought to re-
construct the social fabric of the South, including granting citi-
zenship and suffrage to African Americans. But those gains were 
short-lived, as white southerners adopted Jim Crow laws, literacy 
tests, and other means to limit African-American rights. The 1965 
Voting Rights Act finally outlawed these discriminatory practic-
es, but in recent years laws supposedly targeting voter fraud have 
suppressed voter participation among people of color and both the 
rural and urban poor.
Third U.S. President (and elite slaveholder) Thomas Jeffer-
son envisioned a nation of yeoman farmers that would serve as the 
basis of American democracy. A century later, historian Frederick 
Jackson Turner similarly declared that the western frontier’s wide 
open spaces and supposedly free land formed the basis of Ameri-
can democracy. Many nineteenth-century Americans agreed, and 
this vision shaped many aspects of federal policy for generations. 
For example, Jeffersonian agrarianism motivated both the Lou-
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isiana Purchase and the Homestead Act. But like our history of 
expanding civil rights, the legacy of Jefferson’s vision is complex. 
Only people of some means could afford to migrate west to claim 
land. More than half of claimants failed to prove up on their land. 
Western lands often wound up in the hands of speculators rather 
than family farmers. Moreover, white settlement in the West was 
predicated on the forced removal of native peoples. Indigenous 
peoples’ lives were disrupted or destroyed to enable certain whites 
to become good democratic citizens.
But even as the U.S. government fought wars and displaced 
Native Americans to ensure a nation of independent men, many 
Americans distrusted those western democrats. Painter George 
Caleb Bingham captured this tension in his famous 1852 painting 
The County Election. Although a blue banner declares “The will of 
the people is the supreme law,” the raucous scene highlights the 
influence of party politics, money, alcohol use, and even violence 
on voters – all of them white men, of course. Young boys play with 
a knife in the dirt and a stray dog wanders through the crowd, but 
women and people of color are excluded from participation.
Bingham’s painting celebrated the participation of white men 
from different social classes in western elections. But participation 
by both wealthy businessmen and workingmen does not mean that 
nineteenth-century elections were egalitarian. Party-specific tick-
ets were cast publicly. Viva voce voting persisted in some states. 
While speaking their choices out loud rather than marking a pa-
per ballot made it possible for illiterate men to participate, it also 
made them particularly vulnerable to pressure from the political 
and economic elites.
American agrarian ideals were redefined in the twentieth 
century. Rather than dreaming of owning an independent family 
farm, Americans increasingly dreamed of owning a ranch home 
surrounded by a green lawn in the suburbs. Homeownership re-
placed homestead ownership at the core of the American dream. 
Like nineteenth-century land claim laws, government policies en-
abled wealthier white Americans to buy homes in these suburbs at 
the expense of others.
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For all our faith in Jeffersonian agrarianism as the basis of a 
free, democratic society, Americans have remained suspicious of 
the people who make up that republic. Perhaps this tension be-
tween trust and distrust explains our pendulum swings between 
growing civil rights and disfranchisement, and our continued 
reliance on the Electoral College. Ironically, western lands that 
were supposed to breed democracy instead have become among 
the most inequitably treated under the Electoral College system. 
Due to uneven population distribution, ethnically diverse Califor-
nia and Texas voters are grossly underrepresented in the Electoral 
College, while heavily white Wyoming and North Dakota voters 
are overrepresented. And nearly all western states have become 
among the most reliably “red” or “blue,” thus limiting their im-
pact on the presidential election. In recent presidential elections, 
the Electoral College system has ensured that a few “battleground 
states” – and especially white suburban men and women – have 
determined the outcome of the presidential election. In 2016, ru-
ral Americans in Midwestern “swing states” consistently voted for 
Donald Trump, while urban populations supported Hillary Clin-
ton. white suburbanites proved to be the swingiest of swing voters, 
and they won the Electoral College for Trump, despite Clinton’s 
two percent advantage in the popular vote. Our policies ensured 
that white suburban homeowners living in an earlier trans-Appa-
lachian West would select the next President of the United States.
Americans are not as equal nor as egalitarian as we like to 
believe. The persistent tension between egalitarianism and distrust 
of individuals (especially women and ethnic minorities) contribut-
ed to our uneven progress toward social equality, and may help to 
explain the tenacity of the unequal Electoral College system. 
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Quantifying a Candidate’s Advantage in the 
Electoral College
Timothy Prescott
The Electoral College currently functions as a compromise be-
tween big states (who would like to see votes weighted proportion-
ally to their population, as in the House of Representatives) and 
small states (who would like each state to count equally, as in the 
Senate). Nationally, there are about 600,000 people for each elec-
tor. But in the most extreme example of this weighting, Wyoming, 
there are just under 200,000, so that each Wyoming resident is 
about three times as powerful on the national stage.
Despite this, the biggest reason for the disparity between the 
popular vote and the Electoral College is the fact that every state, 
except for Nebraska and Maine, awards all of its electors to the 
winner of that state. This means that a candidate could hypotheti-
cally lose the popular vote 25% to 75%, but because they eked out 
victories in over half of the states, they could still win the Electoral 
College. In fact, by concentrating on less populous states (current-
ly the 40 smallest), it is possible to push this down to winning with 
less than 23% of the popular vote.
This leads us to consider how candidates have historically 
done in the Electoral College as compared to the national pop-
ular vote (assuming all electors vote as pledged). As the national 
popular vote increases, we’ll distribute the votes proportional to 
that candidate’s eventual support in each state, with each state and 
its electors tipping one by one to the candidate’s side when the 
distributed votes eclipses the opponent’s eventual total. The state 
that finally provides the candidate with a majority in the Electoral 
College determines the election. We’ll call that state the clinching 
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state, and the difference between the clinching state’s margin of 
victory and the candidate’s actual margin of victory their electoral 
advantage.
For example, in the 2016 election, Donald Trump won the 
Electoral College by 74 votes, but lost the popular vote by 2.09%. 
He could have lost Michigan and Pennsylvania and still won the 
Electoral College by 2 votes; it was Wisconsin with its margin of 
.76% that clinched the Electoral College. Therefore, Trump could 
have done .76% worse, lost the popular vote by 2.85%, and it 
would have been Wisconsin that clinched the election. We will say 
that this means Donald Trump had a 2.85% electoral advantage.
In contrast, in 2004 Bush won the popular vote by 2.46%. If 
he had done 2.11% worse in every state, he would have won the 
popular vote by .35%, lost Iowa and New Mexico, and the winner 
of Ohio would have clinched the Electoral College. We’ll say that 
this means Bush had a .35% electoral disadvantage (or a -.35% 
electoral advantage). (In our hypothetical examples, the winning 
candidate had a 50% and 54% advantage.)
Over the last 26 elections (going back to Wilson’s defeat of 
Hughes in 1916), there have been 9 elections where the difference 
in the popular vote was less than 5%, so that we find it meaningful 
to talk about a candidate’s electoral advantage. Ranking them by 
the winner’s advantage, those elections are:
Year Winner Electoral Advantage
2016 Trump    2.85%
1968 Nixon    1.58%
2012 Obama    1.51%
2000 Bush   0.52%
1960 Kennedy  0.35%
2004 Bush  -0.35%
1976 Carter  -0.38%
1916 Wilson  -2.74%
1948 Truman -4.04%
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We observe the following:
• Donald Trump had the best electoral advantage of any victor.
• Truman’s surprise victory in 1948 is all the more impressive given 
that he overcame the worst electoral disadvantage.
• In these elections, the Republican candidate averaged a 1.10% 
electoral advantage.
This last point is worth further investigation. It is likely a combina-
tion of Republicans tending to do better in rural states (which tend 
to have more electors relative to their size) and Democratic candi-
dates running up the score in more populous urban states (which 
helps with the popular vote, but not with the Electoral College).

Section Three
The Future of the Electoral College
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If the Electoral College Can Contradict the 
Popular Vote Sometimes, Why Would It Be Wrong 
for Them To Do It Every Single Time?*
Jack Russell Weinstein
In my role as a public philosopher, I received a question from one 
of my blog readers asking about the independence of the Electoral 
College.1 The person wrote:
Long before the election, my class was discussing 
the Electoral College, and one student opined that it 
should be kept because the popular vote doesn’t ac-
cord with the electoral vote only some of the time. 
This got me thinking, “Would we find it acceptable if 
the popular vote never matched the electoral vote?” It 
would seem that whatever makes it acceptable to have 
the popular vote not match the electoral vote in some 
instances, would also make such an outcome accept-
able in every instance. Or, conversely, whatever makes 
it unacceptable to have the popular vote not match 
the electoral vote in every instance, would also make 
such an outcome unacceptable in each instance. But 
perhaps I’m missing something, so I thought I’d see 
what you have to say in regard to the argumentation. 
To put the question another way: if it is okay for the Electoral Col-
lege to contradict the popular vote once in a while, why isn’t it okay 
* A version of this essay appeared as Jack Russell Weinstein, “If the Elec-
toral College can contradict the popular vote sometimes, why would 
it be wrong for them to do it every single time?” PQED: Philosophical 
Questions Every Day (blog), November 28, 2016, http://www.pqed.
org/2016/11/if-electoral-college-can-contradict.html
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for it to do so all the time? How can opposing the popular vote be 
right only some of the time? 
This is a good, philosophically interesting, and relevant ques-
tion. To answer it, we first have to ask why we have an Electoral 
College in the first place, although, surprisingly, there isn’t a con-
sensus on this basic fact.
One theory is that the Electoral College was intended to give 
an equalizing voice to a region of slaveholders with a smaller white 
population. There is some evidence for this. James Madison him-
self seemed concerned that “the right of suffrage was much more 
diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter 
could have no influence in the election on the score of Negroes” 
(Madison Debates, July 19, 1787).2 In other words, since there 
were more Northern than Southern voters, without the Electoral 
College, the South would not be able to protect its right to main-
tain slaves. 
Some cite Madison’s argument as a case against the very le-
gitimacy of the Electoral College itself, but such a critique isn’t 
persuasive. It runs afoul of the Genetic Fallacy, the observation 
that the truth or validity of a conclusion does not depend on its 
history or origin. Why the Electoral College came into being is 
irrelevant to its current purpose. GPS was invented for the mili-
tary, yet many peace activists still use it. Adolf Hitler designed the 
Volkswagen Beetle (although one scholar argues that Hitler stole 
it from a Jewish engineer),3 yet people who drive them do not nec-
essary subscribe to his fascist philosophy. Similarly, just because the 
Electoral College may have been in support of slavery at one time 
does not mean it is now.
In fact, the real remedy for the Southern states’ dispropor-
tionately small influence was the Three-Fifths Compromise found 
in Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution. Also proposed at 1787 con-
1 PQED: Philosophical Questions Every Day (blog) http://www.pqed.org/
2 James Madison, “July 19, 1787,” in Notes of debates in the Federal Conven-
tion of 1787. See Documents section.
3 Paul Schilperoord, The Extraordinary Life of Josef Ganz: The Jewish En-
gineer Behind Hitler’s Volkswagen. (New York : RVP Publishers, 2012).
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stitutional convention, this clause declared that slaves should be 
counted as three-fifths of a freeperson for voting and taxation. 
The Compromise is frequently and understandably touted 
as a philosophical synecdoche of American racism. But it’s purpose 
was not to reduce the humanity of the slave to less than one as it 
is usually described; it was to give a slave some electoral power in 
the first place, and, by extension, the electoral power of the South. 
Naturally, I do not mean to suggest that the compromise is 
not racist. It is. Slaves did not actually vote, slaveholders simply 
justified their additional electoral power on the backs of slaves us-
ing the Electoral College to consolidate their power. My point is 
simply that people tend not to understand its origins, giving cre-
dence, yet again, to the Genetic Fallacy, and making slavery less 
important to today’s debate about the Electoral College. Once 
slavery was abolished in 1865 and the Three-Fifths Compromise 
rendered obsolete, this aspect of the Electoral College remained 
historically important but functionally irrelevant. 
Another popular justification for the Electoral College also 
stems from the Madison debate: that it is a kind of “affirmative 
action” for rural voters. Given the different population densities of 
urban and agricultural regions, the Electors are supposed to equal-
ize the power of voters across the country. This is the same sort of 
justification the framers used when apportioning two Senators per 
state regardless of their size, while basing the number of Represen-
tatives in the House on population. Without it, many claim, urban 
populations would determine all national elections.
This notion of the Electoral College emphasizes the lack of 
direct democracy in the Federal system. It echoes the Three-Fifths 
Compromise in that it holds that for votes to be equal, they need 
not be identical. Equality necessitates proportional, not uniform, 
representation. 
But there is a problem with continuing to justify the Elec-
toral College on these grounds. First, it assumes that rural voters 
have inherently different interests than urban voters, a generaliza-
tion that simply doesn’t hold. Political positions must be evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis, there is no reason to think that living in 
the country or the city would affect one’s position on internation-
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al relations, abortion, interstate commerce, net neutrality, or the 
vast majority of issues that concern government policies. It may 
affect one’s position on agricultural issues, but even there, farmers 
disagree on ethanol, genetically modified seeding, and the impor-
tance of monoculture farming, to name just a few controversies.
People also tend to assume that rural voters are necessarily 
more conservative than urban voters, but this is simply not the 
case. For many decades, Appalachia was a Democratic stronghold. 
It isn’t anymore; it changed. But that just proves my point. And 
while much has been made of the “traditional” family farm, there 
are few populations that are more embracing of technological 
change and government subsidies, and more suspicious of school 
choice than small farmers. (“Vouchers” and charter schools are un-
tenable in rural areas where many towns share a single school.) 
The rural and urban electorate can simply not be cleanly divided 
into conservative and liberal, no matter how much lip service is 
given to the so-called “real America.”
Regardless of all of these considerations, if increased repre-
sentation of the rural is the reason for the Electoral College, then 
it simply failed to do its job in 2016. It did not magnify the agri-
cultural voice; it increased the influence of the suburbs instead. As 
Joel Kotkin and Wendell Cox summarize in Forbes magazine, it 
wasn’t alleged rural racism that rocketed Trump to power, it was 
the suburban five-point lead, a three-point increase from Romney 
in 2012.4 
To summarize: if slavery is the reason for the Electoral Col-
lege, we can’t answer the reader’s question at all and if voter equity 
is the reason, then all we have learned is that the Electoral College 
has failed. We do not yet know whether there is a moral difference 
between the college opposing the popular vote sometimes and it 
differing all the time. 
4 Joel Kotkin and Wendell Cox, “It Wasn’t Rural ‘Hicks’ Who Elected 
Trump: The Suburbs Were -- And Will Remain -- The Real Battle-
ground,” Forbes. November 22, 2016. Accessed on December 31, 2016. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2016/11/22/donald-trump-clin-
ton-rural-suburbs/
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However, the answer to the reader’s question can be found, 
I think, in what I have always understood as the true purpose of 
the Electoral College: to be an educated body in the face of an 
uneducated public. From Plato onward, one of the most trenchant 
criticisms of democracy has been that public policy is simply too 
complex for the average person to understand. One needs both 
special training in political reasoning, the argument asserts, as well 
as to be able to emancipate oneself from private interest to qualify 
as enlightened voter.
This is the tradition that Hamilton calls upon in Federalist 
No. 68 when he wrote: “electors should be men most capable of 
analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting under cir-
cumstances favorable to deliberation…[they would be] most likely 
to have the information and discernment” required to choose the 
president.5 Ultimately, he argued, the presidency should be deter-
mined by the most qualified voter, not by people who vote simply 
because they are eligible.
  What might have Hamilton meant by these comments and 
how does this change the role of the Electoral College? There are, 
it seems to me, two possible interpretations—and two possible an-
swers to our main question—depending on whether this layer of 
qualified electors are to be regarded as insurance or as a represen-
tative body.
Let’s begin with the first interpretation, that is, that the job 
of the Electoral College is to be a last-ditch effort to protect the 
country from a demagogue who fools the public into voting for 
him or her. If this is the case, then the Electoral College should 
be regarded as an insurance policy and, as with all insurance, we 
hope never to have to use it. We buy insurance hoping to waste 
our money.
Under this interpretation, if the Electoral College contra-
dicts the popular vote with good reason, we should celebrate their 
choice. However, if it does so under conditions different than its 
prescribed safeguard, if, for example, the candidate is not danger-
ous or a demagogue, but simply won because of the vicissitudes of 
5 James Madison, Federalist No.68, in The Federalist Papers. See Docu-
ments section.
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electoral politics, then such a decision is to be deplored and the 
presidency is illegitimate. This illegitimacy is, however, something 
we have to put up with to preserve the protection we might some-
day need. In such a case, a president who did not win the popular 
vote is the “price we pay” for the Electoral College.
In other words, if we consider the Electoral College as an 
insurance policy against demagoguery, the justification for the 
Electoral College is utilitarian. We are willing to accept some bad 
stuff for the greater good. An occasional disagreement between it 
and the popular vote can be justified, but continual disagreement 
cannot.
My personal feeling, by the way, is that this is the true pur-
pose of the Electoral College. Since it did not protect us from 
Trump, it will never protect us from anyone and can no longer be 
justified. Even more so, since one of Hamilton’s specific concerns 
was that the vote might be corrupted by “foreign powers to gain 
an improper ascendant in our councils,” it failed in its very spe-
cific mandate.6 As a preponderance of evidence has shown, Russia 
significantly influenced the election, orchestrating a Clinton loss 
despite her popular-vote landslide. The Electors knew this but 
disregarded it, emphasizing that the Electoral College no longer 
plays its intended part as insurer. It has become, instead, a tool for 
partisan sidestepping of the popular vote. 
The second possible interpretation of Hamilton’s preference 
for educated electors over the general population leads to a de-
ontological justification for the Electoral College—it builds on a 
principle that allows for no exception. It puts forth the idea of rep-
resentative government in its strongest from, regarding electors 
themselves as agents akin to all of our officials, not simply pro-
tectors with narrow mandates whom we call upon in very specific 
situations. 
If we regard Electors as representatives—if we see them like 
Congress members or as specialists who have more refined politi-
cal senses than the layperson—then we have to think of the popular 
vote as only advisory rather than binding. In other words, when the 
general populace votes and expresses its will, the Electors ought 
6 Madison, Federalist No.68. See Documents section.
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to consider it as only one of many factors, and then vote based 
on their personal (allegedly professional and educated) judgment. 
This may or may not assume their personal judgment is better, but 
it does regard their representative role as having more authority to 
choose the president than an average voter. 
There are, incidentally, good and convincing fictional por-
trayals of this point of view. In an episode of The West Wing titled 
“The Lame Duck Congress,” when faced with deciding whether to 
approve a nuclear treaty against the wishes of 82% of the voters, 
the fictional President Bartlett says: 
Can I tell you something, honestly? This is one of those 
situations where I couldn’t give a damn what the peo-
ple think. The complexities of a global arms treaty, the 
technological, the military, the diplomatic nuances, it’s 
staggering, Toby. 82% of the people cannot possibly be 
expected to reach an informed decision.
Bartlett’s point is taken significantly farther by President Andrew 
Shepherd, in the movie The American President:
Lewis Rothschild: …People want leadership, Mr. Pres-
ident, and in the absence of genuine leadership, they’ll 
listen to anyone who steps up to the microphone. They 
want leadership. They’re so thirsty for it they’ll crawl 
through the desert toward a mirage, and when they dis-
cover there’s no water, they’ll drink the sand.
President Andrew Shepherd: Lewis, we’ve had pres-
idents who were beloved, who couldn’t find a coherent 
sentence with two hands and a flashlight. People don’t 
drink the sand because they’re thirsty. They drink the 
sand because they don’t know the difference.
If this point of view is correct and if the American population is 
simply not educated enough to make good democratic decisions, 
then the popular vote is simply advisory to the Electoral College 
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rather than binding. And, if this is the case, the College’s decision 
is, by definition, always right. It and only it, has the job of choosing 
our president. In such an interpretation of Hamilton’s words, there 
is no such thing as an electoral vote that contradicts the popular 
vote, just one that considered it and moved on.
One final observation: differing attitudes about voter 
knowledge is a point of contention in the debate between  John 
Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the patron saints of American 
and French democracy, respectively. The role of individual per-
spective marks a dividing line between the American notion that 
people’s beliefs about their own interest is more important than 
their generalized knowledge, and the French democratic model, 
which assumes that personal interest is secondary to collective 
understanding, or the Republic’s interests. Hamilton’s view of the 
Electoral College as permanent representative seems to fit more 
with the French model than the American one, suggesting, yet 
again, that the Electoral College is inconsistent with American 
democratic values. It seems to me that the given all we have dis-
cussed, the only viable justification for the Electoral College is one 
based on its role as insurance against demagoguery and, as we have 
seen, it has failed in its role. Certainly, this conclusion is based in 
part on my own political leanings, but that doesn’t make it wrong. 
Perspective and bias are not the same thing.
 Nevertheless, to sum up my rather lengthy answer to the 
reader’s question: if the Electoral College is insurance, then we 
have to put up with a couple unjustified conflicts in order to pro-
tect ourselves against potential serious dangers. In such a case, the 
Electoral College must agree with the popular vote in most but 
not all instances, and when it doesn’t, we have to regard it as a 
necessary evil.
But if the Electoral College plays a representative role and 
the general popular vote is advisory, then it is theoretically possi-
ble for the Electoral College to disagree with the majority every 
single time and still be legitimate. In this case, the popular vote 
will always be secondary to the judgment of its representatives. 
Or, as President Bartlett puts it immediately after his comment 
above: “…we forget sometimes, in all the talk about democracy, we 
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forget it’s not a democracy, it’s a republic. People don’t make the 
decisions, they choose the people who make the decisions. Could 
they do a better job choosing? Yeah. But when you consider the 
alternatives,…”
 As is hopefully evident, the reader’s question goes to the 
heart of the American experiment. Are we a democracy or a repub-
lic, and if we are one or the other, is it what we were supposed to be 
or just what we ended up as? The Genetic Fallacy makes original 
intent a less powerful argument for any constitutional interpreta-
tion, but it doesn’t make it less interesting. Whatever damages the 
Electoral College may or may not have inflicted this time around, 
the fact that it has given us an opportunity to reflect on the nature 
of democracy is itself a gift worth celebrating.

10
Electoral College is Fixable; Senate is Not. 
Mark Trahant
The Electoral College was a huge mistake. It’s anti-democratic. It’s 
18th century machinery designed to elect a government despite 
deep philosophical differences between states, regions and cities. 
And, in a digital economy, the mechanics makes no sense.
But the funny thing is: The Electoral College is fixable. 
If votes were counted proportionally, instead of winner-take-
call, the results would be a lot closer to the popular will and still 
account for regional differences in thinking. (This reform would 
not require a Constitutional amendment, but all 50 states would 
have to agree.)
Indeed the Electoral College gets the attention for being un-
democratic when there are other issues in the American version of 
democracy that cry out for real reform. 
Consider the notion of requiring a super-majority in the Sen-
ate (a filibuster-proof 60 votes). The Senate elects two members 
from each state. So California’s 36 million citizens get two votes – 
exactly the same as Wyoming’s 532,000 people. And the super-ma-
jority makes matters worse because senators representing a tiny 
slice of the population can block legislation that most Americans 
favor.
The Senate has a unique history and in that favorite argu-
ment used by so many, “we have always done it that way.” But let’s 
be clear about this, the structure of the Senate does not repre-
sent democratic values. Why does this matter? Especially when it’s 
worked for more than two centuries?
The Senate ceased its claim to democracy in 1920 when the 
census showed that the United States had become an urban nation. 
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A century ago this did not matter because the values and priorities 
were largely the same; the opposite is true now. The greatest divide 
in our politics stems from this rural, urban split on issues ranging 
from natural resource extraction to climate change. Yet the Senate 
skews rural dramatically. It only takes 17 percent of the country 
to elect a majority in the Senate (and that’s not even including the 
additional ten votes required for a supermajority.)
The House is not particularly democratic either. The United 
States is one of the few countries in the world that clings to a dis-
trict system that can be manipulated by a political party. Districts 
are designed to favor incumbents or the party in power. In other 
countries, proportional representation insures that all constituent 
groups are represented in body politic. In a district system, how-
ever, the other party is often shut out from all elective offices in a 
state.
Could there be reform without a new Constitution? Perhaps. 
States could create multiple congressional districts. And Califor-
nia could split into two, three or even four states, to even out the 
Senate a bit. We need more representation, not less. So I’d like to 
see a Senate the size of the House now and a people House of Rep-
resentatives that was significantly larger in order to accommodate 
more points of view.
Democratic reform is critical when the U.S. preaches it as 
a value to the rest of the world. That means system reform, well 
beyond a quick fix to the Electoral College. And, who knows? After 
reform a proportional Electoral College could actually work. Even 
in a digital century.
11
Long Habits and Legitimacy
Mark Stephen Jendrysik
“A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial 
appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry 
in defense of custom.” When Thomas Paine said this in Common 
Sense (1776) he was speaking about monarchy, but he could have 
been saying it about the Electoral College (EC).1 The EC might 
once have had a purpose, and it can be argued that the EC was 
necessary at the beginning of the republic to overcome the ba-
sic problems of time and space that made rapid communication 
of electoral results across a continent-spanning nation difficult if 
not impossible.2 This constitutional feature was designed for a very 
different time.
Like other features of the United States Constitution such as 
state equality in the Senate, the EC is now an ossified remnant of 
a distant past that creates a crisis of political legitimacy every time 
the EC fails to ratify the popular vote. While this has only hap-
pened four times in the history of the country (1876, 1888, 2000 
and 2016), current demographic and political division make it pos-
sible this outcome might become a regular event. If elections are 
repeatedly resolved in the EC to the detriment of popular major-
ities, possibly numbering in the millions, America will face a crisis 
of legitimacy. After all, why should the election of the president be 
1  T. Paine, Common Sense. Philadelphia: Printed. And sold by W . and T. 
Bradford [1776]). Accessed on December 31, 2016. http://xroads.virgin-
ia.edu/~hyper/Paine/common.html
2  It generally took at least two weeks to travel from New York to 
Charleston, South Carolina in 1800. 
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the only election where the majority (or plurality) does not deter-
mine the winner?3 
Every argument in favor of the EC is made mindlessly, or in 
bad faith, or to cover up less than savory ideas. To co-opt George 
Orwell, the EC “can indeed be defended, but only by arguments 
which are too brutal for most people to face.”4 Mindless defenses 
of the EC pop up every four years. Repeatedly saying “We are a 
republic not a democracy” is not an argument, it is an incantation. 
Claiming the EC is a feature of state sovereignty ignores that fact 
that the states are not actually sovereign. Saying “that’s how the 
Founders set it up, and they were greater men than we are” in-
fantilizes those of us alive today. Such thinking makes us children, 
forced to forever obey the Framers, without volition or reason of 
our own. To paraphrase Paine, the Founders might as well have 
declared themselves immortal, since we now have no choice but to 
follow their will.5 
Bad faith arguments in support of the EC are easy to find. 
Donald Trump’s complaints about the EC turned to praise once 
he discovered it was working in his favor. We can also note people 
who say we can just amend the Constitution to get rid of the EC, 
while knowing full well that will never happen. Or we can consider 
the arguments of people in small states whose votes count for more 
than the voters of more populous states. Defending a weighted 
vote system requires a set of rather dubious and ultimately disturb-
ing assumptions.6 For example, saying that the EC protects the in-
terests of rural areas against urban ones, suggests that some voters 
votes should have a greater weight. After all, “Real Americans ™” 
3  In a similar sense, state equality in the Senate poses serious questions 
of legitimacy as well. Currently somewhat less the 15% of the popula-
tion controls over half the seats in the Senate, a trend which will only 
grow more extreme.
4  G. Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” Horizon Vol. 13, No. 
76. (April 1946), 261.
5  See T. Paine, Rights of Man (London: Joseph Johnson, 1791) for a 
discussion of the absurdity of the idea that the dead can constrain the 
living. 
6  Or, maybe you believe that empty space should be allowed to vote. 
51
are the honest sons of the soil, not untrustworthy city slickers. As 
Michael Barone notoriously claimed, the EC protects the country 
from the rule of the voters of California, who, as we all know, don’t 
represent or support real American values.7 And so it is only just 
that their votes count for less in the EC. 
The United States Constitution is an admirable document. 
But parts of it can be compared to a petrified forest, once alive and 
vibrant, now merely existing. Even worse, parts of it, in particu-
lar the EC, are like vestigial organs. Like the appendix, the EC is 
mostly harmless and unnoticed. But every once in a while, the EC 
reminds us of its existence and threatens the health and safety of 
the Republic. In a democracy elections decided by less than a ma-
jority are, on their face, illegitimate.8 Quite simply, choosing the 
single most important office in the world through anti-democratic 
methods leaves a ticking time bomb of disaster at the heart of our 
political system.
7  Michael Barone, “Ditching the Electoral College” Washington Ex-
aminer, December 4, 2016. Accessed December 31, 2016. http://www.
washingtonexaminer.com/ditching-electoral-college-would-allow-cali-
fornia-to-impose-imperial-rule-on-a-colonial-america/article/2608766 
The key paragraph: “California’s 21st century veer to the left makes it a 
live issue again. In a popular vote system, the voters of this geographi-
cally distant and culturally distinct state, whose contempt for heartland 
Christians resembles imperial London’s disdain for the ‘lesser breeds’ it 
governed, could impose something like colonial rule over the rest of the 
nation. Sounds exactly like what the Framers strove to prevent.”
8  There are over 500,000 elected officials in the United States. All of 
them, except the president are chosen by majority or plurality elec-
tions. David Nir, “Just how many elected officials are there in the 
United States? The answer is mind-blowing,” Daily Kos. March 29, 
2015. Accessed on December 31, 2016. http://www.dailykos.com/sto-
ry/2015/3/29/1372225/-Just-how-many-elected-officials-are-there-in-
the-United-States-The-answer-is-mind-blowing
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In Defense of the Electoral College*
Allen Guelzo and James H. Hulme
There is hardly anything in the Constitution harder to explain, or 
easier to misunderstand, than the Electoral College. And when a 
presidential election hands the palm to a candidate who comes in 
second in the popular vote but first in the Electoral College tally, 
something deep in our democratic viscera balks and asks why the 
Electoral College shouldn’t be dumped as a useless relic of 18th 
century white, gentry privilege.
Actually, there have been only five occasions when a closely 
divided popular vote and the electoral vote have failed to point 
in the same direction. No matter. After last week’s results, we’re 
hearing a litany of complaints: the Electoral College is undemo-
cratic, the Electoral College is unnecessary, the Electoral College 
was invented to protect slavery — and the demand to push it down 
the memory hole.
All of which is strange because the Electoral College is at 
the core of our system of federalism. The Founders who sat in 
the 1787 Constitutional Convention lavished an extraordinary 
amount of argument on the Electoral College, and it was by no 
means one-sided. The great Pennsylvania jurist James Wilson 
believed that “if we are to establish a national Government,” the 
president should be chosen by a direct, national vote of the people. 
But wise old Roger Sherman of Connecticut replied that the pres-
ident ought to be elected by Congress, since he feared that direct 
election of presidents by the people would lead to the creation of a 
* A version of this essay appeared as Allen Guelzo and James Hulme, “In 
defense of the Electoral College,” PostEverything (blog), The Washington 
Post, November 15, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/postevery-
thing/wp/2016/11/15/in-defense-of-the-electoral-college/
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monarchy. “An independence of the Executive [from] the supreme 
Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there 
was any such thing.” Sherman was not trying to undermine the 
popular will, but to keep it from being distorted by a president who 
mistook popular election as a mandate for dictatorship.
Quarrels like this flared all through the convention, until, at 
almost the last minute, James Madison “took out a Pen and Paper, 
and sketched out a mode of Electing the President” by a “college” 
of “Electors … chosen by those of the people in each State, who 
shall have the Qualifications requisite.”
The Founders also designed the operation of the Elector-
al College with unusual care. The portion of Article 2, Section 1, 
describing the Electoral College is longer and descends to more 
detail than any other single issue the Constitution addresses. More 
than the federal judiciary — more than the war powers — more 
than taxation and representation. It prescribes in precise detail 
how “Each State shall appoint … a Number of Electors, equal to 
the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the 
State may be entitled in the Congress”; how these electors “shall 
vote by Ballot” for a president and vice president; how they “shall 
sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government 
of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate” the 
results of their balloting; how a tie vote must be resolved; what 
schedule the balloting should follow; and on and on.
Above all, the Electoral College had nothing to do with slav-
ery. Some historians have branded the Electoral College this way 
because each state’s electoral votes are based on that “whole Num-
ber of Senators and Representatives” from each State, and in 1787 
the number of those representatives was calculated on the basis of 
the infamous three-fifths clause. But the Electoral College merely 
reflected the numbers, not any bias about slavery (and in any case, 
the three-fifths clause was not quite as proslavery a compromise as 
it seems, since Southern slaveholders wanted their slaves count-
ed as five-fifths for determining representation in Congress, and 
had to settle for a whittled-down fraction). As much as the abo-
litionists before the Civil War liked to talk about the “proslavery 
Constitution,” this was more of a rhetorical posture than a serious 
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historical argument. And the simple fact remains, from the record 
of the Constitutional Convention’s proceedings (James Madison’s 
famous Notes), that the discussions of the Electoral College and 
the method of electing a president never occur in the context of 
any of the convention’s two climactic debates over slavery.
If anything, it was the Electoral College that made it possible 
to end slavery, since Abraham Lincoln earned only 39 percent of 
the popular vote in the election of 1860, but won a crushing victory 
in the Electoral College. This, in large measure, was why Southern 
slaveholders stampeded to secession in 1860-61. They could do the 
numbers as well as anyone, and realized that the Electoral College 
would only produce more anti-slavery Northern presidents.
Yet, even on those terms, it is hard for Americans to escape 
the uncomfortable sense that, by inserting an extra layer of “elec-
tors” between the people and the president, the Electoral College 
is something less than democratic. But even if we are a democratic 
nation, that is not all we are. The Constitution also makes us a 
federal union, and the Electoral College is pre-eminently both the 
symbol and a practical implementation of that federalism.
The states of the union existed before the Constitution, and 
in a practical sense, existed long before the revolution. Nothing 
guaranteed that, in 1776, the states would all act together, and 
nothing that guaranteed that after the Revolution they might not 
go their separate and quarrelsome ways, much like the German 
states of the 18th century or the South American republics in the 
19th century. The genius of the Constitutional Convention was its 
ability to entice the American states into a “more perfect union.” 
But it was still a union of states, and we probably wouldn’t have 
had a constitution or a country at all unless the route we took was 
federalism.
The Electoral College was an integral part of that federal 
plan. It made a place for the states as well as the people in electing 
the president by giving them a say at different points in a federal 
process and preventing big-city populations from dominating the 
election of a president.
Abolishing the Electoral College now might satisfy an irri-
tated yearning for direct democracy, but it would also mean dis-
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mantling federalism. After that, there would be no sense in having 
a Senate (which, after all, represents the interests of the states), 
and further along, no sense even in having states, except as ad-
ministrative departments of the central government. Those who 
wish to abolish the Electoral College ought to go the distance, 
and do away with the entire federal system and perhaps even retire 
the Constitution, since the federalism it was designed to embody 
would have disappeared.
None of that, ironically, is liable to produce a more demo-
cratic election system. There are plenty of democracies, like Great 
Britain, where no one ever votes directly for a head of the govern-
ment. But more important, the Electoral College actually keeps 
presidential elections from going undemocratically awry because it 
makes unlikely the possibility that third-party candidates will gar-
ner enough votes to make it onto the electoral scoreboard.
Without the Electoral College, there would be no effective 
brake on the number of “viable” presidential candidates. Abolish 
it, and it would not be difficult to imagine a scenario where, in 
a field of a dozen micro-candidates, the “winner” only needs 10 
percent of the vote, and represents less than 5 percent of the elec-
torate. And presidents elected with smaller and smaller pluralities 
will only aggravate the sense that an elected president is governing 
without a real electoral mandate.
The Electoral College has been a major, even if poorly com-
prehended, mechanism for stability in a democracy, something 
which democracies are sometimes too flighty to appreciate. It may 
appear inefficient. But the Founders were not interested in effi-
ciency; they were interested in securing “the blessings of liberty.” 
The Electoral College is, in the end, not a bad device for securing 
that.
13
Electoral College Alternatives: Tradeoffs
Benjamin J. Kassow
Forty-eight states use a popular vote method to allocate electoral 
votes (two states, Nebraska and Maine, use a partially congressio-
nal-district based allocation for the electoral votes in those states). 
One of the key controversies regarding the Electoral College has 
been the degree to which the Electoral College is perceived by 
some to be “anti-democratic” in that people argue that the Elec-
toral College does not reflect the “will of the people.” To me, as 
is often the case, the key thought is thinking about the Electoral 
College as it currently exists and other possible electoral systems 
for the presidency in terms of a series of tradeoffs.
What might these tradeoffs look like? First, do we want 
a system that directly reflects the will of the largest plurality of 
Americans, the majority (50+%) of voting Americans, or one that 
reflects some level of dispersion and geographic viability through-
out a variety of regions in the country? Secondly, depending on 
what we prioritize as a country, what system might we want that 
would reflect these priorities? Thirdly, do most Americans want 
the Electoral College to change? Finally, if many Americans want 
to reform the Electoral College, what tradeoffs would we want to 
make to ensure that people feel that their vote counts?
One first question is how the Electoral College could be 
changed, from a logistical perspective. On first glance, eliminating 
(or strongly modifying) the Electoral College looks daunting. At 
a most basic level, the Constitution must be amended, which of 
course, is exceedingly difficult. While other approaches are possi-
ble to use (changing electoral laws in the states, for instance, which 
decide how to allocate Electoral College votes), questions remain 
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as to what might be the most feasible method to do so. Still, many 
attempts to change the Electoral College certainly exist in Amer-
ican history, although only one has really been fundamental in 
terms of changing the Electoral College allocation proposal in a 
serious way: the Bayh-Celler (H.R. J. Res. 681) Amendment (1969) 
proposal. The intractability of eliminating or massively changing 
the Electoral College is reflected in the relatively few major at-
tempts at the federal level since the Civil War. Additionally, there 
are still substantial questions as to what tradeoffs we might want 
to have as a country, assuming a different approach from what we 
have now.
The second approach: changing state legislation as to how 
states distribute their Electoral College votes. While this is more 
practical, it also raises other potential issues of inequity among 
states, and how much your vote may count for president being in 
one state versus another. Unless somehow all states could change 
concurrently, simply changing a state or two would likely result 
in other problems, including substantial differences in how states 
award electors. This could lead to the potential for large inequities 
among states as to how people’s votes actually count in presiden-
tial elections. From a Constitutional standpoint, specifically with 
regards to the Equal Protection Clause, this may prove problem-
atic (see Bush v Gore, 531 U.S. 98, [2000]), and may lead to other 
concerns about how individual’s votes are counted (i.e., if it varies 
dramatically among states).
Even if a majority of United States citizens approves reform-
ing the Electoral College, another question of practicality also 
rears its head. If we open the Electoral College “Pandora’s box,” 
then what problems might we have with any other potential solu-
tion? Certainly, if we were to have a national popular vote, there 
would be strong criticisms by many that the will of states would 
be taken away. Similarly, if we were to adopt a different system, 
would that help to solve the problems that those who criticize the 
Electoral College level at the College? While it might, depending 
on the solution chosen, a host of other questions would also arise.
So, what could potentially be an alternative to the Electoral 
College, as it currently stands? President Nixon himself, in 1969, 
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proposed replacing the Electoral College with a national popu-
lar-vote based system that would simply award the presidential 
candidate with the highest percentage of the popular vote the 
presidency. One tool in this proposal would have prevented a can-
didate with a very small percentage of the popular vote from lead-
ing, which would be a mandatory runoff election between the top 
two candidates if no candidate exceeded 40% of the popular vote. 
But what tradeoff would a system like this have? The fate of the 
Bayh-Celler amendment, although it is only one case, is perhaps 
quite instructive as to the various tradeoffs involved with altering 
how the Electoral College functions, at the federal level. While 
the amendment passed with bipartisan support through the House 
of Representatives, it was successfully filibustered in the Senate, 
because it would damage the ability of smaller states to influence 
the outcome of United States presidential elections in the future. 
So, as I have already mentioned, the constant tradeoff is in terms 
of how to distribute voting power to choose the president: should 
it be distributed to individuals as one person in the entire United 
States, or distributed to individuals as part of an individual state 
within the United States?
In closing, thinking about the Electoral College, regardless 
of whether we may be in favor of it, opposed to it, or decidedly 
neutral, requires us to consider a series of tradeoffs. Do we want 
a political system that encourages political candidates to have ma-
jorities of geographic regions within the United States, or one that 
encourage presidential candidates to win the most votes more gen-
erally? Which system better reflects the will of the people? In any 
case, when thinking about whether we approve of the Electoral 
College as is or whether/how we may wish to alter it, it is crucial to 
examine any tradeoffs we might be making if we were to change it.

Section Four
Teaching the Electoral College
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“Empathy for the Unicorn”:  
Teaching About the Electoral College
Brad Austin
I approach the topic of “teaching the electoral college” from two 
different, if related, perspectives.1 The first is that of an historian 
trained in modern American history, someone who teaches about 
the disputed elections of 1876 and 2000 and who notes how a few 
thousand votes in specific states would have denied John F. Ken-
nedy the presidency in 1960 and given the nation President Nixon 
ahead of schedule. Like most teachers, I address the basic “rules of 
the game” of the Electoral College and explain how a candidate 
can attract more popular support than his (and now, her) oppo-
sition but still lose the election. Other essays in this volume offer 
teachers and other interested citizens the historical contexts they 
need to teach the mechanics and specific consequences of the Elec-
toral College and those elections. 
My second perspective is that of someone who trains future 
high and middle school history teachers and who spends most of 
my “methods of teaching history” course encouraging my students 
to make their own classes about more than the mere memorization 
of names, dates, treaties, and battles. As someone who emphasizes 
the importance of teaching historical thinking skills (close reading 
of sources, chronological thinking, determining causation, identi-
1  Oddly enough, I discussed the relationship between North Dakota and 
the Electoral College with my Massachusetts university students during 
a wide-ranging conversation on the day after the election. If I recall 
correctly, my remark was something along the lines of “One of the con-
sequences of the electoral college is that individual North Dakota voters 
have a lot more power than we do in presidential elections.” 
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fying perspectives, etc.), I embrace the opportunities that study-
ing the Electoral College provides to teachers who want to chal-
lenge their students’ assumptions and to give them materials and 
questions that push them to formulate arguments and to think for 
themselves. 
Sam Wineburg, in his path-breaking Historical Thinking and 
Other Unnatural Acts, recounts the story of Marco Polo and the 
world’s ugliest unicorns.2 As Wineburg explains, during his travels, 
Polo came across an animal with a head “like a wild Boar” and a 
short, stubby horn. Obviously, it was a unicorn. Polo concluded 
that this animal was “a passing ugly beast to look upon, and is not 
in the least like that which our stories tell of as being caught in 
the lap of a virgin; in fact, ‘tis altogether different from what we 
fancied.”3 Modern readers, of course, recognize that Polo was de-
scribing a rhinoceros, not a unicorn, even if they might concede 
that virgins (and non-virgins alike) might be wise to avoid having 
one sit on their laps.
I include this story not because I find it intrinsically inter-
esting (although I do), but because I second Wineburg’s call for 
history instructors to use their lessons and their classes to enhance 
their students’ capacities for empathy, for understanding how oth-
ers perceive and experience the world. This story demonstrates 
how even very worldly, learned people are often inclined to con-
sider new information and evidence within the confines of existing 
belief systems and paradigms for understanding the world. Put dif-
ferently, we are too often blinded by what we “know” to recognize 
what we see.
After the 2016 presidential election results proved pundits 
to be spectacularly wrong, many commentators pointed to Amer-
icans’ increasing inclination to avoid exposure to conflicting ideas 
and evidence as a reason for the surprise many felt when the out-
2  Sam Wineburg, Historical Thinking and Other Unnatural Acts: Charting 
the Future of Teaching the Past (Temple University Press, 2011), 24. 
3  Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo: The Complete Yule-Cordier 
Edition Dover Publications, 1993), 285.
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come became clear. The causes of our current inability to agree 
on basic facts or the authority of experts will probably spawn a 
thousands dissertations and keep political scientists and sociolo-
gists employed for a generation, but it is not the focus of this essay. 
Our current situation, in fact, reminds us of the obligation history 
teachers have to prepare students for the demands of civic life, and 
teaching the Electoral College offers multiple opportunities for us 
to fulfill that obligation.
Teaching about the history of the Electoral College, and the 
ideologies and assumptions that led to its creation, allows instruc-
tors to challenge their students to see something new (a rhino) 
instead of seeing just another unicorn, if an ugly one. If our stu-
dents are going to develop the ability to understand and appreciate 
different perspectives and viewpoints, then studying history is a 
great place to practice that skill. Specifically, it is vital that our stu-
dents realize that “they” (the founding generation) did not think 
like “us.” Heck, “they” didn’t even think like each other, a fact that 
explains the emergence of Federalist and Anti-Federalist camps 
before the ratification of the Constitution and the almost imme-
diate evolution of political factions into parties after the new gov-
ernment was formed. These divisions and disagreements present 
us with an abundance of opportunities for our students to explore 
how particular experiences (the Revolution, opposition to George 
III, Articles of Confederation, etc.), regional perspectives (coastal, 
in-land, North, South, small state, large state, etc.), economic sit-
uation (merchant, farmer, plantation owner, tradesman, enslaved 
person, etc.) led to different conclusions about the desirability of 
the new government and, especially, its purposefully convoluted 
and anti-democratic way of choosing a chief executive. In short, a 
close look at the intellectual roots of the Electoral College chal-
lenges students to understand how and why our “Founding Fa-
thers” held vastly different opinions about the desirability of this 
system for selecting a president and to consider the roots of those 
disagreements. 
Teachers looking for specific ways to do this need only to 
consult the Documents section of this volume to find abundant 
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primary sources that can help them accomplish their pedagogi-
cal goals. For example, if teachers want to illustrate the wide va-
riety of options considered by the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention, then they can ask their students to read (and perhaps 
translate to 21st-century language) James Madison’s notes on “De-
bates Concerning the Method of Selecting the Executive,” espe-
cially those from June 1st and September 4th. The notes on June 1st 
illustrate some of the options initially considered (direct election, 
Congressional choice, Senate choice, etc.), and the September 4th 
notes document the ways that several leaders argued over the pro-
posed Electoral College plan, with Governeur Morris offering a 
succinct six-part defense of the plan in response to some pointed 
criticism. While teachers would be well served to familiarize them-
selves with the rest of the debate, these two sections alone give 
students enough to see how personal experiences, others’ histories, 
and political philosophies led delegates to very different conclu-
sions about the Electoral College.
Students will also be interested to see that the text of the 
Constitution reflects the delegates’ desires to cede considerable 
power to the states and their legislature. As one can see in Doc-
uments section, Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution reads, in 
part, “Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature 
may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of 
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in 
the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person hold-
ing an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be 
appointed an elector.” Teachers can ask students to create an imag-
inative and comprehensive list of different ways those states could 
have chosen their electors, given only these instructions, and to 
consider the says these options would have empowered different 
groups.
Given the popularity of the Broadway musical based on his 
life, Alexander Hamilton’s involvement in the debate might at-
tract the attention of students. While he participated in the con-
vention debates, Hamilton’s most important contributions to our 
understanding of the purpose of the Electoral College are found 
in his essay, Federalist No. 68, available in the Documents section. 
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Here, Hamilton notes that the Electoral College might be the one 
part of the Constitution that had not yet sparked great discussion, 
something he credited to the fact “that if the manner of [selecting 
the president] be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an 
eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be 
wished for.” The next several paragraphs outlines those advantages 
for readers, and they do so in language that is accessible to students 
who want to see the best case Hamilton could make for the Elec-
toral College. Teachers might want to know if their 21st century 
students agree with Hamilton about the value of these elements of 
the Electoral College. 
If they have their students read Hamilton’s thoughts, then 
teachers might also want to introduce their students to Antifed-
eralist No. 72, in which Republicus questions the wisdom of us-
ing an Electoral College to choose an executive. In this essay (also 
available in the Documents section), the author offers an extended 
critique of this method: 
“I go now to Art. 2, Sec. 1, which vest the supreme con-
tinental executive power in a president -- in order to the 
choice of whom, the legislative body of each state is em-
powered to point out to their constituents some mode 
of choice, or (to save trouble) may choose themselves, a 
certain number of electors, who shall meet in their re-
spective states, and vote by ballot, for two persons, one 
of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same 
state with themselves. Or in other words, they shall vote 
for two, one or both of whom they know nothing of…
Is it then become necessary, that a free people should 
first resign their right of suffrage into other hands be-
sides their own, and then, secondly, that they to whom 
they resign it should be compelled to choose men, whose 
persons, characters, manners, or principles they know 
nothing of? And, after all (excepting some such change 
as is not likely to happen twice in the same century) 
to intrust Congress with the final decision at last? Is it 
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necessary, is it rational, that the sacred rights of man-
kind should thus dwindle down to Electors of electors, 
and those again electors of other electors? This seems 
to be degrading them even below the prophetical curse 
denounced by the good old patriarch, on the offspring 
of his degenerate son: ‘servant of servants’.”
Given that there was clearly a public debate over the Consti-
tution and its many provisions, teachers can seize the opportunity 
to put their students in the shoes of the partisans. In this case, in 
order to have their students understand some of the most import-
ant arguments for and against the Electoral College, teachers could 
have students use Madison’s notes, Hamilton’s Federalist No. 68, 
and the Anti-Federalist essay as their main sources for a classroom 
debate, with students being free to offer their own suggestions for 
choosing a president as well. This exercise would allow, but not 
require, students to research the biographies of the central figures 
and, among the more creative and theatrical students, it could lead 
to Hamilton-style “cabinet meeting” rap battles that draw on spe-
cific primary sources and present historically accurate arguments. 
I’d like to conclude with a final note about how we can prof-
itably talk about assumptions and the Electoral College in the 
classroom. It is worth noting (or leading our students to the real-
ization), that however much they disagreed about the mechanics 
and desirability of the Electoral College, the participants in this 
debate shared some common assumptions about who should have 
the right to vote and to participate in the political process. As other 
essays in this volume point out, one of the purposes of the Elector-
al College was to protect the rights of slaveholders by giving them 
disproportionate political power, thanks in part to the Three-Fifths 
clause elsewhere in the Constitution. Students should note that 
almost no one in the late eighteenth century publically advocated 
for women’s political rights and that Massachusetts’s new consti-
tution stripped voting rights from citizens who did not meet the 
new, higher property-owning threshold for voting. Moreover, in 
the early 1800s, New Jersey stripped women of the right to vote in 
that state, and several other states passed new laws denying African 
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Americans the right to the franchise that they have had previously 
enjoyed. Essentially, “the people” in the new republic had a differ-
ent connotation than it does today. When we ask our students to 
think about why the Founders designed such a complicated, un-
democratic system as the Electoral College, it is useful to broaden 
the discussion to include all of the assumptions they made about 
the trustworthiness of the American electorate and who should 
properly have their views represented in the new government.

Documents

Documents 
To prepare for the Constitutional Convention, James Madison 
studied the governmental and legal histories of other societies, fo-
cusing in particular on why past confederacies had failed. Yet de-
spite all this research, about a month before the convention began, 
Madison confessed to George Washington that he had “scarcely 
ventured” to fashion an opinion about the form and powers that 
a “National executive” might have under a new constitution. As it 
turned out, many of the longest-running disputes at the convention 
concerned the executive branch, and, as Madison later remarked, 
the “difficulty of finding an unexceptionable” method for elect-
ing the president was “deeply felt” by the delegates. Document 1 
(The Constitutional Convention) illuminates the philosophical 
and political issues that shaped the delegates’ debates about the 
executive branch, while Document 2 (Article II of the U.S. Con-
stitution) showcases the method of election they ultimately chose. 
Document 3 (Federalist Paper No. 68) is Alexander Hamilton’s fa-
mous defense of the so-called Electoral College, while Document 
4 (Anti-Federalist Paper No. 68) and Document 5 (Anti-Federalist 
Paper No. 72) represent the Anti-Federalist critique of the system. 
The ratification of the Constitution was not the end of the story, 
however. The partisan battles of the 1790s soon prompted an over-
hauling of the Electoral College, as illustrated by Document 6 (the 
12th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) and Document 7 (Tim-
othy Pickering’s 1803 speech in favor of the 12th Amendment). 
Nevertheless, as shown by Document 8 (Madison’s 1823 letter to 
George Hay), Madison continued to perceive defects in the elec-
toral process, lamenting that many states had embraced winner-
take-all systems for selecting presidential electors, and that each 
state was accorded one vote when presidential elections devolved 
to the House of Representatives. Finally, as evident in Document 
9 (Madison’s 1830 letter to James Hillhouse), over forty years after 
the Constitutional Convention, Madison remained “duly sensible 
to the evils incident to the existing” system for picking the presi-
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dent, and welcomed efforts to improve it. However, even with the 
system’s shortcomings, Madison was confident that “it will be a 
rare case that the Presidential contest will not issue in a choice 
that will not discredit the Station, and not be acquiesced in by the 
unsuccessful party, foreseeing as it must do, the appeal to be again 
made at no very distant day, to the will of the Nation.”
In addition to the documents provided in this volume, many 
useful resources concerning the Electoral College can be found 
on the web (hyperlinks are in bold). Wikipedia, for example, has 
interesting charts showing how states picked presidential electors 
during the early American republic and how each state’s allotment 
of electoral votes has changed over time. As was the case during the 
nation’s initial years, the 1960s witnessed extensive debates about 
the Electoral College. One of the most striking episodes occurred 
in 1966 when Delaware filed suit against New York, charging 
that the latter’s winner-take-all system for awarding electoral votes 
hurt the less populous states. Also noteworthy during this period 
was President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1966 speech in favor of reform, 
and comparable addresses in 1969 by Congressman Gerald Ford 
and President Richard Nixon, all three of which can be found 
here. More recently, the supporters of the National Popular Vote 
Interstate Compact have attempted to effectively replace the 
Electoral College with a national popular vote, but their prospects 
for success appear uncertain, since a 2016 Gallop poll showed 
support for the Electoral College to be at a fifty-year high.
Document 1
The Constitutional Convention
Debates Concerning the Method of Selecting the Executive
(June 1 - September 6, 1787)
FRIDAY June 1, 1787
William Houston from Georgia took his seat.
The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7. “that a 
national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Leg-
islature-for the term of ------ years &c to be ineligible thereafter, 
to possess the executive powers of Congress &c.”
Mr. PINKNEY was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid 
the Executive powers of the existing Congress might extend to 
peace & war &c., which would render the Executive a monarchy, 
of the worst kind, to wit an elective one.
Mr. WILSON moved that the Executive consist of a single 
person.
Mr. C PINKNEY seconded the motion, so as to read “that a 
National Ex. to consist of a single person, be instituted.
A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he 
should put the question, Docr. FRANKLIN observed that it was 
a point of great importance and wished that the gentlemen would 
deliver their sentiments on it before the question was put.
Mr. RUTLIDGE animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen 
on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed 
themselves precluded by having frankly disclosed their opinions 
from afterwards changing them, which he did not take to be at all 
the case. He said he was for vesting the Executive power in a single 
person, tho’ he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. 
A single man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer 
the public affairs best.
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Mr. SHERMAN said he considered the Executive magistra-
cy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the 
Legislature into effect, that the person or persons ought to be ap-
pointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the 
depositary of the supreme will of the Society. As they were the best 
judges of the business which ought to be done by the Executive 
department, and consequently of the number necessary from time 
to time for doing it, he wished the number might not be fixed but 
that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more as 
experience might dictate.
Mr. WILSON preferred a single magistrate, as giving most 
energy dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not con-
sider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in 
defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were 
of Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The 
only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of execut-
ing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and ap-
pointed by the Legislature.
Mr. GERRY favored the policy of annexing a Council to the 
Executive in order to give weight & inspire confidence. Mr. RAN-
DOLPH strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. 
He regarded it as the foetus of monarchy. We had he said no mo-
tive to be governed by the British Governmt. as our prototype. He 
did not mean however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If 
we were in a situation to copy it he did not know that he should be 
opposed to it; but the fixt genius of the people of America required 
a different form of Government. He could not see why the great 
requisites for the Executive department, vigor, despatch & respon-
sibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man. The 
Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in order to 
support its independence to consist of more than one.
Mr. WILSON said that unity in the Executive instead of be-
ing the fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyr-
anny. He repeated that he was not governed by the British Model 
which was inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent 
of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing 
but a great confederated Republic would do for it. Mr. Wilson’s 
motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common consent, 
the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the 
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first part of the clause agreed to, viz-”that a National Executive be 
instituted.”
Mr. MADISON thought it would be proper, before a choice 
shd. be made between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to 
fix the extent of the Executive authority; that as certain powers 
were in their nature Executive, and must be given to that depart-
mt. whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of 
their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they 
might be safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved 
that so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the 
powers of the Executive shd. be struck out & that after the words 
“that a national Executive ought to be instituted” there be inserted 
the words following viz. “with power to carry into effect the na-
tional laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided 
for, and to execute such other powers “not Legislative nor Judi-
ciary in their nature,” as may from time to time be delegated by 
the national Legislature.” The words “not legislative nor judiciary 
in their nature” were added to the proposed amendment in con-
sequence of a suggestion by Genl. Pinkney that improper powers 
might otherwise be delegated.
Mr. WILSON seconded this motion-
Mr. PINKNEY moved to amend the amendment by striking 
out the last member of it; viz: “and to execute such other powers 
not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature as may from time to 
time be delegated.” He said they were unnecessary, the object of 
them being included in the “power to carry into effect the national 
laws.”
Mr. RANDOLPH seconded the motion.
Mr. MADISON did not know that the words were absolute-
ly necessary, or even the preceding words-”to appoint to offices 
&c. the whole being perhaps included in the first member of the 
proposition. He did not however see any inconveniency in retain-
ing them, and cases might happen in which they might serve to 
prevent doubts and misconstructions.
In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinkney, the question 
on Mr. Madison’s motion was divided; and the words objected to 
by Mr. Pinkney struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y. N. 
J. Pena. Del. N. C. & Geo. agst. Mass. Virga. & S. Carolina the 
preceding part of the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut 
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divided, all the other States in the affirmative. The next clause in 
Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, & the duration 
of, the Executive being under consideration,
Mr. WILSON said he was almost unwilling to declare the 
mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it 
might appear chimerical. He would say however at least that in 
theory he was for an election by the people. Experience, particu-
larly in N. York & Massts., shewed that an election of the first mag-
istrate by the people at large, was both a convenient & successful 
mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose 
merits have general notoriety.
Mr. SHERMAN was for the appointment by the Legisla-
ture, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it 
was the will of that which was to be executed. An independence of 
the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the 
very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.
Mr. WILSON moves that the blank for the term of duration 
should be filled with three years, observing at the same time that he 
preferred this short period, on the supposition that a reeligibility 
would be provided for.
Mr. PINKNEY moves for seven years.
Mr. SHERMAN was for three years, and agst. the doctrine 
of rotation as throwing out of office the men best qualifyed to ex-
ecute its duties.
Mr. MASON was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting 
a re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect 
of a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit 
characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to in-
trigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment.
Mr. BEDFORD was strongly opposed to so long a term as 
seven years. He begged the committee to consider what the situa-
tion of the Country would be, in case the first magistrate should be 
saddled on it for such a period and it should be found on trial that 
he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose 
them after his appointment. An impeachment he said would be no 
cure for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, 
not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibil-
ity after a period of nine years.
On the question for seven years, Massts. dividd. Cont. no. N. 
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Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. 
no. There being 5ays, 4 noes, 1 divd., a question was asked whether 
a majority had voted in the affirmative? The President decided that 
it was an affirmative vote.
The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question.
Mr. WILSON renewed his declarations in favor of an ap-
pointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both 
branches of the Legislature from the people, without the inter-
vention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order 
to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as 
of the States;
Col. MASON favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He 
wishes however that Mr. Wilson might have time to digest it into 
his own form.-the clause “to be chosen by the National Legisla-
ture”-was accordingly postponed.-
Mr. RUTLIDGE suggests an election of the Executive by 
the second branch only of the national Legislature.
The Committee then rose and the House
Adjourned.
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Thursday July 19, 1787
IN CONVENTION
On reconsideration of the vote rendering the Executive re-eligible 
a 2d. time, Mr. MARTIN moved to reinstate the words, “to be 
ineligible a 2d. time.”
Mr. GOVERNEUR MORRIS. It is necessary to take into 
one view all that relates to the establishment of the Executive; on 
the due formation of which must depend the efficacy & utility of 
the Union among the present and future States. It has been a max-
im in Political Science that Republican Government is not adapted 
to a large extent of Country, because the energy of the Executive 
Magistracy can not reach the extreme parts of it. Our Country is 
an extensive one. We must either then renounce the blessings of 
the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient vigor to pervade 
every part of it. This subject was of so much importance that he 
hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of it. One great object of 
the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The Legislature will 
continually seek to aggrandize & perpetuate themselves; and will 
seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion or con-
vulsion for that purpose. It is necessary then that the Executive 
Magistrate should be the guardian of the people, even of the lower 
classes, agst. Legislative tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy 
who in the course of things will necessarily compose the Legisla-
tive body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind & to nourish its love 
of power, and to stimulate it to oppression. History proves this to 
be the spirit of the opulent. The check provided in the 2d. branch 
was not meant as a check on Legislative usurpations of power, but 
on the abuse of lawful powers, on the propensity in the 1st. branch 
to legislate too much to run into projects of paper money & similar 
expedients. It is no check on Legislative tyranny. On the contrary 
it may favor it, and if the 1st. branch can be seduced may find the 
means of success. The Executive therefore ought to be so consti-
tuted as to be the great protector of the Mass of the people. -It is 
the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers & to command 
the forces of the Republic: to appoint 1. ministerial officers for the 
administration of public affairs. 2. officers for the dispensation of 
Justice. Who will be the best Judges whether these appointments 
be well made? The people at large, who will know, will see, will feel 
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the effects of them. Again who can judge so well of the discharge of 
military duties for the protection & security of the people, as the 
people themselves who are to be protected & secured? -He finds 
too that the Executive is not to be re-eligible. What effect will this 
have?
1. it will destroy the great incitement to merit public esteem 
by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment. 
It may give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the 
human breast. The love of fame is the great spring to noble & illus-
trious actions. Shut the Civil road to Glory & he may be compelled 
to seek it by the sword.
2. It will tempt him to make the most of the short space of 
time allotted him, to accumulate wealth and provide for his friends.
3. It will produce violations of the very constitution it is 
meant to secure. In moments of pressing danger the tried abili-
ties and established character of a favorite Magistrate will prevail 
over respect for the forms of the Constitution. The Executive is 
also to be impeachable. This is a dangerous part of the plan. It 
will hold him in such dependence that he will be no check on the 
Legislature, will not be a firm guardian of the people and of the 
public interest. He will be the tool of a faction, of some leading 
demagogue in the Legislature. These then are the faults of the Ex-
ecutive establishment as now proposed. Can no better establishmt. 
be devised? If he is to be the Guardian of the people let him be ap-
pointed by the people? If he is to be a check on the Legislature let 
him not be impeachable. Let him be of short duration, that he may 
with propriety be re-eligible. It has been said that the candidates 
for this office will not be known to the people. If they be known 
to the Legislature, they must have such a notoriety and eminence 
of Character, that they can not possibly be unknown to the people 
at large. It cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently 
distinguished himself to merit this high trust without having his 
character proclaimed by fame throughout the Empire. As to the 
danger from an unimpeachable magistrate he could not regard it 
as formidable. There must be certain great officers of State; a min-
ister of finance, of war, of foreign affairs &c. These he presumes 
will exercise their functions in subordination to the Executive, and 
will be amenable by impeachment to the public Justice. Without 
these ministers the Executive can do nothing of consequence. He 
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suggested a biennial election of the Executive at the time of elect-
ing the 1st. branch, and the Executive to hold over, so as to prevent 
any interregnum in the administration. An election by the people 
at large throughout so great an extent of country could not be in-
fluenced, by those little combinations and those momentary lies 
which often decide popular elections within a narrow sphere. It 
will probably, be objected that the election will be influenced by 
the members of the Legislature; particularly of the 1st. branch, 
and that it will be nearly the same thing with an election by the 
Legislature itself. It could not be denied that such an influence 
would exist. But it might be answered that as the Legislature or the 
candidates for it would be divided, the enmity of one part would 
counteract the friendship of another: that if the administration of 
the Executive were good, it would be unpopular to oppose his re-
election, if bad it ought to be opposed & a reappointmt. prevented; 
and lastly that in every view this indirect dependence on the favor 
of the Legislature could not be so mischievous as a direct depen-
dence for his appointment. He saw no alternative for making the 
Executive independent of the Legislature but either to give him his 
office for life, or make him eligible by the people-Again, it might 
be objected that two years would be too short a duration. But he 
believes that as long as he should behave himself well, he would 
be continued in his place. The extent of the Country would secure 
his re-election agst. the factions & discontents of particular States. 
It deserved consideration also that such an ingredient in the plan 
would render it extremely palatable to the people. These were the 
general ideas which occurred to him on the subject, and which led 
him to wish & move that the whole constitution of the Executive 
might undergo reconsideration.
Mr. RANDOLPH urged the motion of Mr. L. Martin for re-
storing the words making the Executive ineligible a 2d. time. If he 
ought to be independent, he should not be left under a temptation 
to court a re-appointment. If he should be re- appointable by the 
Legislature, he will be no check on it. His revisionary power will be 
of no avail. He had always thought & contended as he still did that 
the danger apprehended by the little States was chimerical; but 
those who thought otherwise ought to be peculiarly anxious for 
the motion. If the Executive be appointed, as has been determined, 
by the Legislature, he will probably be appointed either by joint 
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ballot of both houses, or be nominated by the 1st. and appointed 
by the 2d. branch. In either case the large States will preponderate. 
If he is to court the same influence for his re-appointment, will 
he not make his revisionary power, and all the other functions of 
his administration subservient to the views of the large States. Be-
sides, is there not great reason to apprehend that in case he should 
be re-eligible, a false complaisance in the Legislature might lead 
them to continue an unfit man in office in preference to a fit one. 
It has been said that a constitutional bar to reappointment will 
inspire unconstitutional endeavours to perpetuate himself. It may 
be answered that his endeavours can have no effect unless the peo-
ple be corrupt to such a degree as to render all precautions hope-
less: to which may be added that this argument supposes him to 
be more powerful & dangerous, than other arguments which have 
been used, admit, and consequently calls for stronger fetters on his 
authority. He thought an election by the Legislature with an inca-
pacity to be elected a second time would be more acceptable to the 
people that the plan suggested by Mr. Govr. Morris.
Mr. KING. did not like the ineligibility. He thought there 
was great force in the remark of Mr. Sherman, that he who has 
proved himself to be most fit for an Office, ought not to be ex-
cluded by the constitution from holding it. He would therefore 
prefer any other reasonable plan that could be substituted. He was 
much disposed to think that in such cases the people at large would 
chuse wisely. There was indeed some difficulty arising from the 
improbability of a general concurrence of the people in favor of 
any one man. On the whole he was of opinion that an appointment 
by electors chosen by the people for the purpose, would be liable 
to fewest objections.
Mr. PATTERSON’s ideas nearly coincided he said with 
those of Mr. King. He proposed that the Executive should be ap-
pointed by Electors to be chosen by the States in a ratio that would 
allow one elector to the smallest and three to the largest States. Mr. 
WILSON. It seems to be the unanimous sense that the Executive 
should not be appointed by the Legislature, unless he be rendered 
in-eligible a 2d. time: he perceived with pleasure that the idea was 
gaining ground, of an election mediately or immediately by the 
people.
Mr. MADISON. If it be a fundamental principle of free 
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Govt. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should 
be separately exercised, it is equally so that they be independently 
exercised. There is the same & perhaps greater reason why the 
Executive shd. be independent of the Legislature, than why the 
Judiciary should: A coalition of the two former powers would be 
more immediately & certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is es-
sential then that the appointment of the Executive should either 
be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, that will give 
him a free agency with regard to the Legislature. This could not be 
if he was to be appointable from time to time by the Legislature. It 
was not clear that an appointment in the 1st. instance even with an 
eligibility afterwards would not establish an improper connection 
between the two departments. Certain it was that the appointment 
would be attended with intrigues and contentions that ought not 
to be unnecessarily admitted. He was disposed for these reasons to 
refer the appointment to some other source. The people at large 
was in his opinion the fittest in itself. It would be as likely as any 
that could be devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of dis-
tinguished Character. The people generally could only know & 
vote for some Citizen whose merits had rendered him an object of 
general attention & esteem. There was one difficulty however of a 
serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people. The 
right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than 
the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the 
election on the score of the Negroes. The substitution of electors 
obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to 
fewest objections.
Mr. GERRY. If the Executive is to be elected by the Legis-
lature he certainly ought not to be re-eligible. This would make 
him absolutely dependent. He was agst. a popular election. The 
people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing 
men. He urged the expediency of an appointment of the Executive 
by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives. The people of 
the States will then choose the 1st. branch: The legislatures of the 
States the 2d. branch of the National Legislature, and the Execu-
tives of the States, the National Executive. This he thought would 
form a strong attachnt. in the States to the National System. The 
popular mode of electing the chief Magistrate would certainly be 
the worst of all. If he should be so elected & should do his duty, he 
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will be turned out for it like Govr. Bowdoin in Massts. & President 
Sullivan in N. Hamshire.
On the question on Mr. Govr. Morris motion to reconsider 
generally the constitution of the Executive. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay 
& all the others ay. 
Mr. ELSEWORTH moved to strike out the appointmt. by 
the Natl. Legislature, and insert “to be chosen by electors appoint-
ed, by the Legislatures of the States in the following ratio; tow-
it-one for each State not exceeding 200,000 inhabts. two for each 
above yt. number & not exceeding 300,000. and three for each 
State exceeding 300,000.
Mr. BROOME 2ded. the motion
Mr. RUTLIDGE was opposed to all the modes except the 
appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature. He will be sufficiently inde-
pendent, if he be not re-eligible.
Mr. GERRY preferred the motion of Mr. Elseworth to an 
appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature, or by the people; tho’ not to 
an appt. by the State Executives. He moved that the electors pro-
posed by Mr. E. should be 25 in number, and allotted in the fol-
lowing proportion. to N. H. 1. to Mas. 3. to R. I. 1. to Cont. 2. to 
N. Y. 2. N. J. 2. Pa. 3. Del. 1. Md. 2. Va. 3. N. C. 2. S. C. 2. Geo. 1.
The question as moved by Mr. Elseworth being divided, on 
the 1st. part shall ye. Natl. Executive be appointed by Electors? 
Mas. divd. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. 
S. C. no. Geo. no. 
On 2d. part shall the Electors be chosen by State Legisla-
tures? Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. 
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. 
The part relating to the ratio in which the States sd. chuse 
electors was postponed nem. con.
Mr. L. MARTIN moved that the Executive be ineligible a 
2d. time.
Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ds. the motion. He had no great con-
fidence in the Electors to be chosen for the special purpose. They 
would not be the most respectable citizens; but persons not occu-
pied in the high offices of Govt. They would be liable to undue 
influence, which might the more readily be practised as some of 
them will probably be in appointment 6 or 8 months before the 
object of it comes on.
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Mr. ELSEWORTH supposed any persons might be ap-
pointed Electors, excepting solely, members of the Natl. Legisla-
ture.
On the question shall he be ineligible a 2d. time? Mas. no. 
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. 
Geo. no. 
On the question Shall the Executive continue for 7 years? It 
passed in the negative Mas. divd. Cont. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. 
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 
Mr. KING was afraid we shd. shorten the term too much.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS was for a short term, in order to avoid 
impeachts. which wd.. be otherwise necessary.
Mr. BUTLER was agst. a frequency of the elections. Geo. & 
S. C. were too distant to send electors often.
Mr. ELSEWORTH was for 6. years. If the elections be too 
frequent, the Executive will not be firm eno’. There must be duties 
which will make him unpopular for the moment. There will be 
outs as well as ins. His administration therefore will be attacked 
and misrepresented.
Mr. WILLIAMSON was for 6 years. The expence will be 
considerable & ought not to be unnecessarily repeated. If the Elec-
tions are too frequent, the best men will not undertake the service 
and those of an inferior character will be liable to be corrupted.
On question for 6 years? Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. 
no. Md
. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 
Adjourned 
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Tuesday July 24, 1787
IN CONVENTION
The appointment of the Executive by Electors reconsidered.
Mr. HOUSTON moved that he be appointed by the “Natl. 
Legislature,” instead of “Electors appointed by the State Legisla-
tures” according to the last decision of the mode. He dwelt chiefly 
on the improbability, that capable men would undertake the ser-
vice of Electors from the more distant States.
Mr. SPAIGHT seconded the motion.
Mr. GERRY opposed it. He thought there was no ground 
to apprehend the danger urged by Mr. Houston. The election of 
the Executive Magistrate will be considered as of vast importance 
and will excite great earnestness. The best men, the Governours 
of the States will not hold it derogatory from their character to be 
the electors. If the motion should be agreed to, it will be necessary 
to make the Executive ineligible a 2d. time, in order to render him 
independent of the Legislature; which was an idea extremely re-
pugnant to his way of thinking.
Mr. STRONG supposed that there would be no necessity, if 
the Executive should be appointed by the Legislature, to make him 
ineligible a 2d. time; as new elections of the Legislature will have 
intervened; and he will not depend for his 2d. appointment on the 
same sett of men as his first was recd. from. It had been suggested 
that gratitude for his past appointment wd. produce the same effect 
as dependence for his future appointment. He thought very differ-
ently. Besides this objection would lie agst. the Electors who would 
be objects of gratitude as well as the Legislature. It was of great 
importance not to make the Govt. too complex which would be 
the case if a new sett of men like the Electors should be introduced 
into it. He thought also that the first characters in the States would 
not feel sufficient motives to undertake the office of Electors.
Mr. WILLIAMSON was for going back to the original 
ground; to elect the Executive for 7 years and render him ineligi-
ble a 2d. time. The proposed Electors would certainly not be men 
of the 1st. nor even of the 2d. grade in the States. These would all 
prefer a seat either in the Senate or the other branch of the Legis-
lature. He did not like the Unity in the Executive. He had wished 
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the Executive power to be lodged in three men taken from three 
districts into which the States should be divided. As the Executive 
is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and there is an essential dif-
ference of interests between the N. & S. States, particularly in the 
carrying trade, the power will be dangerous, if the Executive is to 
be taken from part of the Union, to the part from which he is not 
taken. The case is different here from what it is in England; where 
there is a sameness of interests throughout the Kingdom. Another 
objection agst. a single Magistrate is that he will be an elective 
King, and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare no pains to keep 
himself in for life, and will then lay a train for the succession of his 
children. It was pretty certain he thought that we should at some 
time or other have a King; but he wished no precaution to be omit-
ted that might postpone the event as long as possible. -Ineligibility 
a 2d. time appeared to him to be the best precaution. With this 
precaution he had no objection to a longer term than 7 years. He 
would go as far as 10 or 12 years.
Mr. GERRY moved that the Legislatures of the States 
should vote by ballot for the Executive in the same proportions as 
it had been proposed they should chuse electors; and that in case 
a majority of the votes should not center on the same person, the 
1st. branch of the Natl. Legislature should chuse two out of the 4 
candidates having most votes, and out of these two, the 2d. branch 
should chuse the Executive.
Mr. KING seconded the motion-and on the Question to 
postpone in order to take it into consideration. The noes were so 
predominant, that the States were not counted.
Question on Mr. Houston’s motion that the Executive be 
appd. by Nal. Legislature
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. 
no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 
Mr. L. MARTIN & Mr. GERRY moved to re-instate the 
ineligibility of the Executive a 2d. time.
Mr. ELSEWORTH. With many this appears a natural con-
sequence of his being elected by the Legislature. It was not the 
case with him. The Executive he thought should be reelected if 
his conduct proved him worthy of it. And he will be more likely to 
render himself, worthy of it if he be rewardable with it. The most 
eminent characters also will be more willing to accept the trust 
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under this condition, than if they foresee a necessary degradation 
at a fixt period.
Mr. GERRY. That the Executive shd. be independent of the 
Legislature is a clear point. The longer the duration of his appoint-
ment the more will his dependence be diminished. It will be better 
then for him to continue 10, 15, or even 20, years and be ineligible 
afterwards.
Mr. KING was for making him re-eligible. This is too great 
an advantage to be given up for the small effect it will have on his 
dependence, if impeachments are to lie. He considered these as 
rendering the tenure during pleasure.
Mr. L. MARTIN, suspending his motion as to the ineligibil-
ity, moved “that the appointmt. of the Executive shall continue for 
Eleven years.
Mr. GERRY suggested fifteen years
Mr. KING twenty years. This is the medium life of princes. 
Mr. DAVIE Eight years
Mr. WILSON. The difficulties & perplexities into which 
the House is thrown proceed from the election by the Legislature 
which he was sorry had been reinstated. The inconveniency of this 
mode was such that he would agree to almost any length of time 
in order to get rid of the dependence which must result from it. 
He was persuaded that the longest term would not be equivalent 
to a proper mode of election; unless indeed it should be during 
good behaviour. It seemed to be supposed that at a certain advance 
in life, a continuance in office would cease to be agreeable to the 
officer, as well as desirable to the public. Experience had shewn in 
a variety of instances that both a capacity & inclination for public 
service existed-in very advanced stages. He mentioned the instance 
of a Doge of Venice who was elected after he was 80 years of age. 
The popes have generally been elected at very advanced periods, 
and yet in no case had a more steady or a better concerted policy 
been pursued than in the Court of Rome. If the Executive should 
come into office at 35. years of age, which he presumes may hap-
pen & his continuance should be fixt at 15 years. at the age of 50. 
in the very prime of life, and with all the aid of experience, he must 
be cast aside like a useless hulk. What an irreparable loss would 
the British Jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of 50. been 
fixt there as the ultimate limit of capacity or readiness to serve 
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the public. The great luminary [Ld. Mansfield] held his seat for 
thirty years after his arrival at that age. Notwithstanding what had 
been done he could not but hope that a better mode of election 
would yet be adopted; and one that would be more agreeable to the 
general sense of the House. That time might be given for further 
deliberation he wd. move that the present question be postponed 
till tomorrow.
Mr. BROOM seconded the motion to postpone.
Mr. GERRY. We seem to be entirely at a loss on this head. 
He would suggest whether it would not be adviseable to refer the 
clause relating to the Executive to the Committee of detail to be 
appointed. Perhaps they will be able to hit on something that may 
unite the various opinions which have been thrown out.
Mr. WILSON. As the great difficulty seems to spring from 
the mode of election, he wd. suggest a mode which had not been 
mentioned. It was that the Executive be elected for 6 years by a 
small number, not more than 15 of the Natl. Legislature, to be 
drawn from it, not by ballot, but by lot and who should retire im-
mediately and make the election without separating. By this mode 
intrigue would be avoided in the first instance, and the dependence 
would be diminished. This was not he said a digested idea and 
might be liable to strong objections.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS. Of all possible modes of appointment 
that by the Legislature is the worst. If the Legislature is to appoint, 
and to impeach or to influence the impeachment, the Executive will 
be the mere creature of it. He had been opposed to the impeach-
ment but was now convinced that impeachments must be provided 
for, if the appt. was to be of any duration. No man wd. say, that 
an Executive known to be in the pay of an Enemy, should not be 
removeable in some way or other. He had been charged heretofore 
[by Col. Mason] with inconsistency in pleading for confidence in 
the Legislature on some occasions, & urging a distrust on others. 
The charge was not well founded. The Legislature is worthy of un-
bounded confidence in some respects, and liable to equal distrust 
in others. When their interest coincides precisely with that of their 
Constituents, as happens in many of their Acts, no abuse of trust 
is to be apprehended. When a strong personal interest happens to 
be opposed to the general interest, the Legislature can not be too 
much distrusted. In all public bodies there are two parties. The 
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Executive will necessarily be more connected with one than with 
the other. There will be a personal interest therefore in one of the 
parties to oppose as well as in the other to support him. Much had 
been said of the intrigues that will be practised by the Executive 
to get into office. Nothing had been said on the other side of the 
intrigues to get him out of office. Some leader of party will always 
covet his seat, will perplex his administration, will cabal with the 
Legislature, till he succeeds in supplanting him. This was the way 
in which the King of England was got out, he meant the real King, 
the Minister. This was the way in which Pitt [Ld. Chatham] forced 
himself into place. Fox was for pushing the matter still farther. If 
he carried his India bill, which he was very near doing, he would 
have made the Minister, the King in form almost as well as in sub-
stance. Our President will be the British Minister, yet we are about 
to make him appointable by the Legislature. Something had been 
said of the danger of Monarchy. If a good government should not 
now be formed, if a good organization of the Execuve should not 
be provided, he doubted whether we should not have something 
worse than a limited Monarchy. In order to get rid of the depen-
dence of the Executive on the Legislature, the expedient of making 
him ineligible a 2d. time had been devised. This was as much as to 
say we shd. give him the benefit of experience, and then deprive 
ourselves of the use of it. But make him ineligible a 2d. time-and 
prolong his duration even to 15- years, will he by any wonderful 
interposition of providence at that period cease to be a man? No he 
will be unwilling to quit his exaltation, the road to his object thro’ 
the Constitution will be shut; he will be in possession of the sword, 
a civil war will ensue, and the Commander of the victorious army 
on which ever side, will be the despot of America. This consider-
ation renders him particularly anxious that the Executive should 
be properly constituted. The vice here would not, as in some other 
parts of the system be curable. It is the most difficult of all rightly 
to balance the Executive. Make him too weak: The Legislature will 
usurp his powers: Make him too strong. He will usurp on the Leg-
islature. He preferred a short period, a re-eligibility, but a different 
mode of election. A long period would prevent an adoption of the 
plan: it ought to do so. He shd. himself be afraid to trust it. He 
was not prepared to decide on Mr. Wilson’s mode of election just 
hinted by him. He thought it deserved consideration It would be 
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better that chance sd. decide than intrigue.
On a question to postpone the consideration of the Resolu-
tion on the subject of the Executive
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. divd. Md. ay. 
Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr. WILSON then moved that the Executive be chosen ev-
ery ------- years by ------- Electors to be taken by lot from the 
Natl Legislature who shall proceed immediately to the choice of 
the Executive and not separate until it be made.”
Mr. CARROL 2ds. the motion
Mr. GERRY. this is committing too much to chance. If the 
lot should fall on a sett of unworthy men, an unworthy Executive 
must be saddled on the Country. He thought it had been demon-
strated that no possible mode of electing by the Legislature could 
be a good one.
Mr. KING. The lot might fall on a majority from the same 
State which wd. ensure the election of a man from that State. We 
ought to be governed by reason, not by chance. As nobody seemed 
to be satisfied, he wished the matter to be postponed
Mr. WILSON did not move this as the best mode. His opin-
ion remained unshaken that we ought to resort to the people for 
the election. He seconded the postponement.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS observed that the chances were almost 
infinite agst. a majority of electors from the same State.
On a question whether the last motion was in order, it was 
determined in the affirmative; 7. ays. 4 noes.
On the question of postponent. it was agreed to nem. con.
Mr. CARROL took occasion to observe that he considered 
the clause declaring that direct taxation on the States should be 
in proportion to representation, previous to the obtaining an ac-
tual census, as very objectionable, and that he reserved to himself 
the right of opposing it, if the Report of the Committee of detail 
should leave it in the plan.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS hoped the Committee would strike out 
the whole of the clause proportioning direct taxation to represen-
tation. He had only meant it as a bridge to assist us over a certain 
gulph; having passed the gulph the bridge may be removed. He 
thought the principle laid down with so much strictness, liable to 
strong objections
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On a ballot for a Committee to report a Constitution con-
formable to the Resolutions passed by the Convention, the mem-
bers chosen were Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Ghorum, Mr. 
Elseworth, Mr. Wilson-
On motion to discharge the Come. of the whole from the 
propositions submitted to the Convention by Mr. C. Pinkney as 
the basis of a constitution, and to refer them to the Committee of 
detail just appointed, it was agd. to nem: con.
A like motion was then made & agreed to nem: con: with 
respect to the propositions of Mr. Patterson
Adjourned.
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Tuesday July 25, 1787
IN CONVENTION
Clause relating to the Executive again under consideration.
Mr. ELSEWORTH moved “that the Executive be appoint-
ed by the Legislature,” except when the magistrate last chosen shall 
have continued in office the whole term for which he was chosen, 
& be reeligible, in which case the choice shall be by Electors ap-
pointed by the Legislatures of the States for that purpose.” By this 
means a deserving magistrate may be reelected without making 
him dependent on the Legislature. 
Mr. GERRY repeated his remark that an election at all by the 
Natl. Legislature was radically and incurably wrong; and moved 
that the Executive be appointed by the Governours & Presidents 
of the States, with advice of their Councils, and where there are no 
Councils by Electors chosen by the Legislatures. The executives to 
vote in the following proportions: viz-
Mr. MADISON. There are objections agst. every mode that 
has been, or perhaps can be proposed. The election must be made 
either by some existing authority under the Natil. or State Con-
stitutions-or by some special authority derived from the people-or 
by the people themselves. -The two Existing authorities under the 
Natl. Constitution wd. be the Legislative & Judiciary. The latter he 
presumed was out of the question. The former was in his Judgment 
liable to insuperable objections. Besides the general influence of 
that mode on the independence of the Executive, 1. the election 
of the Chief Magistrate would agitate & divide the legislature so 
much that the public interest would materially suffer by it. Public 
bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more 
violent ones by such occasions than by any others. 2. the candidate 
would intrigue with the Legislature, would derive his appointment 
from the predominant faction, and be apt to render his adminis-
tration subservient to its views. 3. The Ministers of foreign powers 
would have and make use of, the opportunity to mix their intrigues 
& influence with the Election. Limited as the powers of the Exec-
utive are, it will be an object of great moment with the great rival 
powers of Europe who have American possessions, to have at the 
head of our Governmt. a man attached to their respective poli-
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tics & interests. No pains, nor perhaps expense, will be spared, to 
gain from the Legislature an appointmt. favorable to their wishes. 
Germany & Poland are witnesses of this danger. In the former, 
the election of the Head of the Empire, till it became in a man-
ner hereditary, interested all Europe, and was much influenced by 
foreign interference. In the latter, altho’ the elective Magistrate 
has very little real power, his election has at all times produced 
the most eager interference of forign princes, and has in fact at 
length slid entirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities in 
the States are the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The appoint-
ment of the Natl. Executive by the first, was objectionable in many 
points of view, some of which had been already mentioned. He 
would mention one which of itself would decide his opinion. The 
Legislatures of the States had betrayed a strong propensity to a 
variety of pernicious measures. One object of the Natl. Legislre. 
was to controul this propensity. One object of the Natl. Executive, 
so far as it would have a negative on the laws, was to controul the 
Natl. Legislature, so far as it might be infected with a similar pro-
pensity. Refer the appointmt. of the Natl. Executive to the State 
Legislatures, and this controuling purpose may be defeated. The 
Legislatures can & will act with some kind of regular plan, and will 
promote the appointmt. of a man who will not oppose himself to 
a favorite object. Should a majority of the Legislatures at the time 
of election have the same object, or different objects of the same 
kind, The Natl. Executive would be rendered subservient to them. 
-An appointment by the State Executives, was liable among other 
objections to this insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they 
could & would be courted, and intrigued with by the Candidates, 
by their partizans, and by the Ministers of foreign powers. The 
State Judiciarys had not & he presumed wd. not be proposed as 
a proper source of appointment. The option before us then lay 
between an appointment by Electors chosen by the people-and 
an immediate appointment by the people. He thought the former 
mode free from many of the objections which had been urged agst. 
it, and greatly preferable to an appointment by the Natl. Legisla-
ture. As the electors would be chosen for the occasion, would meet 
at once, & proceed immediately to an appointment, there would 
be very little opportunity for cabal, or corruption. As a farther pre-
caution, it might be required that they should meet at some place, 
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distinct from the seat of Govt. and even that no person within a 
certain distance of the place at the time shd. be eligible. This Mode 
however had been rejected so recently & by so great a majori-
ty that it probably would not be proposed anew. The remaining 
mode was an election by the people or rather by the qualified part 
of them, at large: With all its imperfections he liked this best. He 
would not repeat either the general argumts. for or the objections 
agst. this mode. He would only take notice of two difficulties which 
he admitted to have weight. The first arose from the disposition in 
the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and the disadvan-
tage this wd. throw on the smaller States. Great as this objection 
might be he did not think it equal to such as lay agst. every other 
mode which had been proposed. He thought too that some expedi-
ent might be hit upon that would obviate it. The second difficulty 
arose from the disproportion of qualified voters in the N. & S. 
States, and the disadvantages which this mode would throw on the 
latter. The answer to this objection was 1. that this disproportion 
would be continually decreasing under the influence of the Repub-
lican laws introduced in the S. States, and the more rapid increase 
of their population. 2. That local considerations must give way to 
the general interest. As an individual from the S. States he was 
willing to make the sacrifice.
Mr. ELSEWORTH. The objection drawn from the differ-
ent sizes of the States, is unanswerable. The Citizens of the largest 
States would invariably prefer the Candidate within the State; and 
the largest States wd. invariably have the man.
Question on Mr. Elseworth’s motion as above.
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. 
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 
Mr. PINKNEY moved that the election by the Legislature 
be qualified with a proviso that no person be eligible for more than 
6 years in any twelve years. He thought this would have all the 
advantage & at the same time avoid in some degree the inconveni-
ency, of an absolute ineligibility a 2d. time.
Col. MASON approved the idea. It had the sanction of expe-
rience in the instance of Congs. and some of the Executives of the 
States. It rendered the Executive as effectually independent, as an 
ineligibility after his first election, and opened the way at the same 
time for the advantage of his future services. He preferred on the 
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whole the election by the Nati. Legislature: Tho’ Candor obliged 
him to admit, that there was great danger of foreign influence, as 
had been suggested. This was the most serious objection with him 
that had been urged.
Mr. BUTLER. The two great evils to be avoided are cabal at 
home, & influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either 
if the Election be made by the Natl. Legislature. On the other 
hand: The Govt. should not be made so complex & unwieldy as to 
disgust the States. This would be the case, if the election shd. be re-
ferred to the people. He liked best an election by Electors chosen 
by the Legislatures of the States. He was agst. are-eligibility at all 
events. He was also agst. a ratio of votes in the States. An equality 
should prevail in this case. The reasons for departing from it do 
not hold in the case of the Executive as in that of the Legislature.
Mr. GERRY approved of Mr. Pinkney’s motion as lessening 
the evil.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS was agst. a rotation in every case. It 
formed a political School, in wch we were always governed by the 
scholars, and not by the Masters. The evils to be guarded agst. in 
this case are 1. the undue influence of the Legislature. 2. instability 
of Councils. 3. misconduct in office. To guard agst. the first, we run 
into the second evil. We adopt a rotation which produces instabil-
ity of Councils. To avoid Sylla we fall into Charibdis. A change of 
men is ever followed by a change of measures. We see this fully 
exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves, particularly in the 
State of Pena. The self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to 
tread in the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not imitate 
Soloman. 2. the Rotation in office will not prevent intrigue and de-
pendence on the Legislature. The man in office will look forward 
to the period at which he will become re-eligible. The distance of 
the period, the improbability of such a protraction of his life will be 
no obstacle. Such is the nature of man, formed by his benevolent 
author no doubt for wise ends, that altho’ he knows his existence 
to be limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were to live 
for ever. But taking another supposition, the inefficacy of the ex-
pedient will be manifest. If the magistrate does not look forward 
to his re-election to the Executive, he will be pretty sure to keep 
in view the opportunity of his going into the Legislature itself. He 
will have little objection then to an extension of power on a theatre 
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where he expects to act a distinguished part; and will be very un-
willing to take any step that may endanger his popularity with the 
Legislature, on his influence over which the figure he is to make 
will depend. 3. To avoid the third evil, impeachments will be essen-
tial, and hence an additional reason agst. an election by the Legis-
lature. He considered an election by the people as the best, by the 
Legislature as the worst, mode. Putting both these aside, he could 
not but favor the idea of Mr. Wilson, of introducing a mixture of 
lot. It will diminish, if not destroy both cabal & dependence.
Mr. WILLIAMSON was sensible that strong objections lay 
agst. an election of the Executive by the Legislature, and that it 
opened a door for foreign influence. The principal objection agst. 
an election by the people seemed to be, the disadvantage under 
which it would place the smaller States. He suggested as a cure for 
this difficulty, that each man should vote for 3 candidates, One of 
these he observed would be probably of his own State, the other 
2. of some other States; and as probably of a small as a large one.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS liked the idea, suggesting as an amend-
ment that each man should vote for two persons one of whom at 
least should not be of his own State.
Mr. MADISON also thought something valuable might be 
made of the suggestion with the proposed amendment of it. The 
second best man in this case would probably be the first, in fact. 
The only objection which occurred was that each Citizen after 
havg. given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen, wd. throw away 
his second on some obscure Citizen of another State, in order to 
ensure the object of his first choice. But it could hardly be sup-
posed that the Citizens of many States would be so sanguine of 
having their favorite elected, as not to give their second vote with 
sincerity to the next object of their choice. It might moreover be 
provided in favor of the smaller States that the Executive should 
not be eligible more than times in years from the same State.
Mr. GERRY. A popular election in this case is radically vi-
cious. The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of 
some one set of men dispersed through the Union & acting in 
Concert to delude them into any appointment. He observed that 
such a Society of men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati. They 
are respectable, United, and influencial. They will in fact elect the 
chief Magistrate in every instance, if the election be referred to 
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the people. His respect for the characters composing this Society 
could not blind him to the danger & impropriety of throwing such 
a power into their hands.
Mr. DICKENSON. As far as he could judge from the dis-
cussions which had taken place during his attendance, insupera-
ble objections lay agst. an election of the Executive by the Natl. 
Legislature; as also by the Legislatures or Executives of the States. 
He had long leaned towards an election by the people which he 
regarded as the best & purest source. Objections he was aware 
lay agst. this mode, but not so great he thought as agst. the other 
modes. The greatest difficulty in the opinion of the House seemed 
to arise from the partiality of the States to their respective Citizens. 
But, might not this very partiality be turned to a useful purpose. 
Let the people of each State chuse its best Citizen. The people will 
know the most eminent characters of their own States, and the 
people of different States will feel an emulation in selecting those 
of which they will have the greatest reason to be proud. Out of the 
thirteen names thus selected, an Executive Magistrate may be cho-
sen either by the Natl. Legislature, or by Electors appointed by it.
On a Question which was moved for postponing Mr. Pink-
ney’s motion; in order to make way for some such proposition as 
had been hinted by Mr. Williamson & others: it passed in the neg-
ative.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. 
ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 
On Mr. Pinkney’s motion that no person shall serve in the 
Executive more than 6 years in 12. years, it passed in the negative.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. 
no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 
On a motion that the members of the Committee be fur-
nished with copies of the proceedings it was so determined; S. Car-
olina alone being in the negative.
It was then moved that the members of the House might take 
copies of the Resolions which had been agreed to; which passed in 
the negative. N. H. no. Mas. no. Con: ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. 
Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr. GERRY & Mr. BUTLER moved to refer the resolution 
relating to the Executive (except the clause making it consist of a 
single person) to the Committee of detail
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Mr. WILSON hoped that so important a branch of the Sys-
tem wd. not be committed untill a general principle shd. be fixed 
by a vote of the House.
Mr. LANGDON, was for the Commitment-Adjd.
Document 2
U.S. Constitution : Article II
Section 1- President: his term of office. Electors of Presi-
dent; number and how appointed. Electors to vote on same 
day. Qualification of President. On whom his duties devolve 
in case of his removal, death, etc. President’s compensation. 
His oath of office.
1. The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the Unit-
ed States of America. He shall hold office during the term of four 
years, and together with the Vice President, chosen for the same 
term, be elected as follows:
2. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature may 
direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Sena-
tors and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the 
Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an 
office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed 
an elector. The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote 
by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant 
of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the 
persons voted for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of Government of the United States, directed to the 
President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence 
of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and 
the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number 
of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole 
number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such 
majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Repre-
sentatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President; 
and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list 
the said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing 
the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from 
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each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a 
member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all 
the States shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of 
the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the elec-
tors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more 
who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them by ballot the Vice 
President. (The clause in italics was superseded by Ammendment 
XII)
3. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, 
and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be 
the same throughout the United States.
4. No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the 
United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, 
shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person 
be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age 
of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the 
United States.
5. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his 
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties 
of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and 
the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, 
resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice President, 
declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer 
shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President 
shall be elected. (This clause has been modified by Amendment 
XX and Amendment XXV)
6. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a 
compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished 
during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he 
shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the 
United States, or any of them.
7. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the 
following oath or affirmation: 
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
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office of the President of the United States, and will to the best of 
my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.”
Section 2 - President to be Commander-in-Chief. He may 
require opinions of cabinet officers, etc., may pardon. Trea-
ty-making power. Nomination of certain officers. When Pres-
ident may fill vacancies.
1. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, 
when called into the actual service of the United States; he may re-
quire the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the 
executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of 
their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves 
and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases 
of impeachment.
2. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators 
present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other 
officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but 
the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior 
officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts 
of law, or in the heads of departments.
3. The President shall have the power to fill up all vacancies that 
may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commis-
sions, which shall expire at the end of their next session.
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Section 3 - President shall communicate to Congress. He may 
convene and adjourn Congress, in case of disagreement, etc. 
Shall receive ambassadors, execute laws, and commission of-
ficers.
He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of 
the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such 
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on 
extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, 
and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the 
time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall 
think proper; he may receive ambassadors, and other public minis-
ters; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall 
commission all the officers of the United States.
Section 4 - All civil offices forfeited for certain crimes.
The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and con-
viction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemean-
ors.
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Federalist Paper No. 68
The Mode of Electing the President from the New York Packet.
Friday, March 14, 1788.
To the People of the State of New York:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the 
United States is almost the only part of the system, of any conse-
quence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has 
received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. 
The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even 
deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well 
guarded.1 I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, 
that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It 
unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which 
was to be wished for.
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate 
in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to 
be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of 
making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by 
the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjunc-
ture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should 
be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to 
the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to delibera-
tion, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and induce-
ments which were proper to govern their choice. A small number 
of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, 
will be most likely to possess the information and discernment req-
uisite to such complicated investigations.
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity 
as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be 
dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so import-
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ant an agency in the administration of the government as the Pres-
ident of the United States. But the precautions which have been so 
happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an 
effectual security against this mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, 
to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to 
convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent move-
ments, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final 
object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each 
State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are cho-
sen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less 
to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them 
to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in 
one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practica-
ble obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. 
These most deadly adversaries of republican government might 
naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more 
than one querter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to 
gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they bet-
ter gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief 
magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against 
all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious at-
tention. They have not made the appointment of the President to 
depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered 
with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it 
in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, 
to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole 
purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from 
eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be sus-
pected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, 
representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit 
under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. 
Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate 
agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from 
any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situ-
ation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their 
continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, 
when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires 
time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to 
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embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in 
any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could 
not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to 
mislead them from their duty.
Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Ex-
ecutive should be independent for his continuance in office on all 
but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sac-
rifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was neces-
sary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will 
also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special 
body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single pur-
pose of making the important choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised 
by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall 
choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of 
senators and representatives of such State in the national govern-
ment, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit 
person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted 
to the seat of the national government, and the person who may 
happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the 
President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen 
to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a 
majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, 
the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who 
shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their 
opinion may be best qualified for the office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the 
office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not 
in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. 
Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone 
suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it 
will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to estab-
lish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of 
so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him 
a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of 
the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will 
be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters 
pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no in-
considerable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who 
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are able to estimate the share which the executive in every gov-
ernment must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. 
Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet 
who says: “For forms of government let fools contest That which 
is best administered is best,’’ yet we may safely pronounce, that 
the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to 
produce a good administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with 
the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in re-
spect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Represen-
tatives, in respect to the latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-Pres-
ident, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It 
has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have autho-
rized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering 
that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas 
of the convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times 
the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary 
that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the 
senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that 
of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the 
State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The 
other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally 
become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive 
magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election 
prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to 
the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this, 
as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie 
against the constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Gov-
ernor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, 
and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties 
similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exer-
cise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.
Pubius.
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Anti-Federalist Paper No. 68 
On the Mode of Electing the President
From a speech by William Grayson given to the Virginia ratifying convention 
on June 18, 1788.
Mr. [William] GRAYSON. Mr. Chairman, one great objection 
with me is this: If we advert to..... [the] democratical, aristocrati-
cal, or executive branch, we shall find their powers are perpetually 
varying and fluctuating throughout the whole. Perhaps the demo-
cratic branch would be well constructed, were it not for this defect. 
The executive is still worse, in this respect, than the democratic 
branch. He is to be elected by a number of electors in the country; 
but the principle is changed when no person has a majority of the 
whole number of electors appointed, or when more than one have 
such a majority, and have an equal number of votes; for then the 
lower house is to vote by states. It is thus changing throughout the 
whole. It seems rather founded on accident than any principle of 
government I ever heard of. We know that there scarcely ever was 
an election of such an officer without the interposition of foreign 
powers. Two causes prevail to make them intermeddle in such cas-
es:-one is, to preserve the balance of power; the other, to preserve 
their trade. These causes have produced interferences of foreign 
powers in the election of the king of Poland. All the great pow-
ers of Europe have interfered in an election which took place not 
very long ago, and would not let the people choose for themselves. 
We know how much the powers of Europe have interfered with 
Sweden. Since the death of Charles XII, that country has been a 
republican government. Some powers were willing it should be so; 
some were willing her imbecility should continue; others wished 
the contrary; and at length the court of France brought about a 
revolution, which converted it into an absolute government. Can 
America be free from these interferences? France, after losing 
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Holland, will wish to make America entirely her own. Great Brit-
ain will wish to increase her influence by a still closer connection. 
It is the interest of Spain, from the contiguity of her possessions 
in the western hemisphere to the United States, to be in an inti-
mate connection with them, and influence their deliberations, if 
possible. I think we have every thing, to apprehend from such in-
terferences. It is highly probable the President will be continued 
in office for life. To gain his favor, they will support him. Consider 
the means of importance he will have by creating officers. If he has 
a good understanding with the Senate, they will join to prevent a 
discovery of his misdeeds. . . .
This quadrennial power cannot be justified by ancient history. 
There is hardly an instance where a republic trusted its executive 
so long with much power; nor is it warranted by modern republics. 
The delegation of power is, in most of them, only for one year.
When you have a strong democratical and a strong aristocrat-
ical branch, you may have a strong executive. But when those are 
weak, the balance will not be preserved, if you give the executive 
extensive powers for so long a time. As this government is orga-
nized, it would be dangerous to trust the President with such pow-
ers. How will you punish him if he abuse his power? Will you call 
him before the Senate? They are his counsellors and partners in 
crime. Where are your checks? We ought to be extremely cautious 
in this country. If ever the government be changed, it will probably 
be into a despotism. The first object in England was to destroy the 
monarchy; but the aristocratic branch restored him, and of course 
the government was organized on its ancient principles. But were 
a revolution to happen here, there would be no means of restoring 
the government to its former organization. This is a caution to us 
not to trust extensive powers. I have an extreme objection to the 
mode of his election. I presume the seven Eastern States will always 
elect him. As he is vested with the power of making treaties, and 
as there is a material distinction between the carrying and produc-
tive states, the former will be disposed to have him to themselves. 
He will accommodate himself to their interests in forming treaties, 
and they will continue him perpetually in office. Thus mutual in-
terest will lead them reciprocally to support one another. It will be 
a government of a faction, and this observation will apply to every 
part of it; for, having a majority, they may do what they please. I 
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have made an estimate which shows with what facility they will be 
able to reelect him. The number of electors is equal to the number 
of representatives and senators; viz., ninety-one. They are to vote 
for two persons. They give, therefore, one hundred and eighty-two 
votes. Let there be forty-five votes for four different candidates, 
and two for the President. He is one of the five highest, if he have 
but two votes, which he may easily purchase. In this case, by the 
3d clause of the lst section of the 2d article, the election is to be by 
the representatives, according to states. Let New Hampshire be for 
him,-a majority of its . . . . .
        3 representatives is 2
Rhode Island  1 1
Connecticut  5 3
New Jersey  4 3
Delaware  1 1
Georgia  3 2
North Carolina 5 3
A majority of seven states is 15 Thus the majority of seven 
states is but 15, while the minority amounts to 50. The total num-
ber of voices (91 electors and 65 representatives) is . . 
156 Voices in favor of the President are, 2 state electors and 
15 representatives ..... 17 
139 So that the President may be reelected by the voices of 
17 against 139.
It may be said that this is an extravagant case, and will never 
happen. In my opinion, it will often happen. A person who is a 
favorite of Congress, if he gets but two votes of electors, may, by 
the subsequent choice of 15 representatives, be elected President. 
Surely the possibility of such a case ought to be excluded.
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Anti-Federalist Paper No. 72
On the Electoral College; On ReEligibility of the President
By an anonymous writer “REPUBLICUS,” appearing in the keNtuckY 
Gazette on March 1, 1788.
. . I go now to Art. 2, Sec. 1, which vest the supreme continental 
executive power in a president-in order to the choice of whom, 
the legislative body of each state is empowered to point out to 
their constituents some mode of choice, or (to save trouble) may 
choose themselves, a certain number of electors, who shall meet 
in their respective states, and vote by ballot, for two persons, one 
of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves. Or in other words, they shall vote for two, one or both 
of whom they know nothing of. An extraordinary refinement this, 
on the plain simple business of election; and of which the grand 
convention have certainly the honor of being the first inventors; 
and that for an officer too, of so much importance as a president 
- invested with legislative and executive powers; who is to be com-
mander in chief of the army, navy, militia, etc.; grant reprieves and 
pardons; have a temporary negative on all bills and resolves; con-
vene and adjourn both houses of congress; be supreme conservator 
of laws; commission all officers; make treaties; and who is to con-
tinue four years, and is only removable on conviction of treason 
or bribery, and triable only by the senate, who are to be his own 
council, whose interest in every instance runs parallel with his own, 
and who are neither the officers of the people, nor accountable to 
them.
Is it then become necessary, that a free people should first 
resign their right of suffrage into other hands besides their own, 
and then, secondly, that they to whom they resign it should be 
compelled to choose men, whose persons, characters, manners, or 
principles they know nothing of? And, after all (excepting some 
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such change as is not likely to happen twice in the same century) 
to intrust Congress with the final decision at last? Is it necessary, is 
it rational, that the sacred rights of mankind should thus dwindle 
down to Electors of electors, and those again electors of other elec-
tors? This seems to be degrading them even below the prophetical 
curse denounced by the good old patriarch, on the offspring of his 
degenerate son: “servant of servants”. . .
Again I would ask (considering how prone mankind are to 
engross power, and then to abuse it) is it not probable, at least 
possible, that the president who is to be vested with all this de-
miomnipotence - who is not chosen by the community; and who 
consequently, as to them, is irresponsible and independent-that 
he, I say, by a few artful and dependent emissaries in Congress, 
may not only perpetuate his own personal administration, but also 
make it hereditary? By the same means, he may render his sus-
pensive power over the laws as operative and permanent as that 
of G. the 3d over the acts of the British parliament; and under the 
modest title of president, may exercise the combined authority of 
legislation and execution, in a latitude yet unthought of. Upon his 
being invested with those powers a second or third time, he may 
acquire such enormous influence-as, added to his uncontrollable 
power over the army, navy, and militia; together with his private 
interest in the officers of all these different departments, who are 
all to be appointed by himself, and so his creatures, in the true 
political sense of the word; and more especially when added to 
all this, he has the power of forming treaties and alliances, and 
calling them to his assistance-that he may, I say, under all these 
advantages and almost irresistible temptations, on some pretended 
pique, haughtily and contemptuously, turn our poor lower house 
(the only shadow of liberty we shall have left) out of doors, and 
give us law at the bayonet’s point. Or, may not the senate, who 
are nearly in the same situation, with respect to the people, from 
similar motives and by similar means, erect themselves easily into 
an oligarchy, towards which they have already attempted so large 
a stride? To one of which channels, or rather to a confluence of 
both, we seem to be fast gliding away; and the moment we arrive 
at it-farewell liberty. . . .
To conclude, I can think of but one source of right to govern-
ment, or any branch of it-and that is THE PEOPLE. They, and 
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only they, have a right to determine whether they will make laws, 
or execute them, or do both in a collective body, or by a delegated 
authority. Delegation is a positive actual investiture. Therefore if 
any people are subjected to an authority which they have not thus 
actually chosen-even though they may have tamely submitted to 
it-yet it is not their legitimate government. They are wholly pas-
sive, and as far as they are so, are in a state of slavery. Thank heaven 
we are not yet arrived at that state. And while we continue to have 
sense enough to discover and detect, and virtue en(>ugh to detest 
and oppose every attempt, either of force or fraud, either from 
without or within, to bring us into it, we never will.
Let us therefore continue united in the cause of rational lib-
erty. Let unity and liberty be our mark as well as our motto. For 
only such an union can secure our freedom; and division will inev-
itably destroy it. Thus a mountain of sand may peace meal [sic] be 
removed by the feeble hands of a child; but if consolidated into a 
rock, it mocks the united efforts of mankind, and can only fall in a 
general wreck of nature.
Republicus.
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Amendment 12
Manner of Choosing a President and Vice-President
This Amendment altered Article 2 Section 1 Part 2
Passed by Congress December 9, 1803. Ratified July 27, 1804.
1. The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by 
ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, 
shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they 
shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and of the 
number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and 
transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States, 
directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate 
shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; - The 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be 
the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of 
Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from 
the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the 
list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives 
shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing 
the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation 
from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and 
a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the 
House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right 
of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next 
following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in case of the 
death or other constitutional disability of the President. (The words in 
italics were superseded by Amendment XX)
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3. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-Presi-
dent, shall be the Vice-President, if such numbers be a majority of 
the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate 
shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall 
consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a ma-
jority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be 
eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
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Timothy Pickering, Speech in Favor of 
the Twelfth Amendement
Timothy Pickering, [Speech in favor of the twelfth amendment], circa 
October 17, 1803. (The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, 
GLC05321.02) 
Mr Speaker -, 
The People, by their Electors shall elect the President, this is un-
doubtedly the meaning and the true constriction given the Con-
stitution,- then to carry this fully into effect is doubtless pursuing 
the wishes of the framers of that Instrument: - and I contend that 
the Amendment under consideration is calculated to accomplish 
this object and without this amendment, a person not having the 
confidence of the Nation may be elected - can it be said with this 
contingent, that the Constitution will inspire so full confidence as 
if [inserted: the] difficulty was removed. -Confidence in a Republi-
can government is important, confidence cannot be placed in such 
a government if the majority cannot govern. - , But, Sir, we are 
told that certain great States are determined to use up all authority 
and bear down the constitution; that the very place where we are 
now [at] is to become Virginia property, and therefore we must 
not tutch that sacred instrument the constitution. - and, Sir if this 
be so: Suppose at the time of the late Presidental [sic] election, no 
President had been elected untill after the fourth of March - who 
would answer for the consequences? would not the great States 
then have refused (in agreeing to a new Constitution which must 
then have been formed) to give the small States an equal vote with 
the larger in the Senate, - and this precious article in the present 
Constitution cannot ever be altered - privelages enjoyid under the 
present constitution are much greater than could be expected were 
a new Constitution now to be formed, - to prevent the Constitution 
from running out by the present amendment is of more importance 
to the Small States, than can possibly ever be gained to them by, elect-
ing a President under the Constitution as it now is. – 
[2] I believe, Sir we outfit not to calculate to turn, or have a wish 
for the election of a President, in any other way than by the Electors, 
for without this popular privelage the constitution would not have 
been adopted - again four small States which send but Eight mem-
bers to the House of representatives have a right to Sixteen votes for 
President while a great State, having a right to send say from 18 to 25 
Members can add but two to her number in the choice of a President 
is [inserted: not] this advantage great enough for small States in that 
particular, under such an institution. -, On the subject of innovation, 
great clamour is made. I am not infavor of innovation or amend-
ments except for important and mighty considerations; - but were 
not amendments expected: most certainly they were expected and I 
will venture & say that without this provision, the constitution would 
never have been adopted. - And will any Gent.n Say that amendments 
have as yet injured the constitution: it is a well known fact that the 
amendments already incorporated into the constitution have greatly 
increased its friends. - One Gentn afraid this amendment will also 
increase its friends, and stability and in that way prevent and destroy a 
favorite object with [Lernes], namly , a division of the Union between 
the northern and southern States}- I will not accuse any gentn. In 
this house with such base motion but Sir I believe there are men base 
enough in New England to wish for such a measure., Under an im-
pression that the proposed amendment if adopted will give Stability 
and duration to the Constitution I shall give it my hearty support - , 
[docket], Legislature 1804
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23 Aug. 1823
I have received your letter of the 11th, with the Newspapers con-
taining your remarks on the present mode of electing a President, 
and your proposed remedy for its defects. I am glad to find you 
have not abandoned your attention to great Constitutional topics.
The difficulty of finding an unexceptionable process for appoint-
ing the Executive Organ of a Government such as that of the U.S. 
was deeply felt by the Convention; and as the final arrangement of 
it took place in the latter stage of the Session, it was not exempt 
from a degree of the hurrying influence produced by fatigue and 
impatience in all such Bodies, tho’ the degree was much less than 
usually prevails in them.
The part of the arrangement which casts the eventual ap-
pointment on the House of Reps. voting by States, was, as you pre-
sume, an accommodation to the anxiety of the smaller States for 
their sovereign equality, and to the jealousy of the larger towards 
the cumulative functions of the Senate. The agency of the H. of 
Reps. was thought safer also than that of the Senate, on account 
of the greater number of its members. It might indeed happen 
that the event would turn on one or two States having one or two 
Reps. only; but even in that case, the representations of most of 
the States being numerous, the House would present greater ob-
stacles to corruption than the Senate with its paucity of Members. 
It may be observed also, that altho’ for a certain period the evil 
of State votes given by one or two individuals would be extended 
by the introduction of new States, it would be rapidly diminished 
by growing populations within extensive territories. At the present 
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period, the evil is at its maximum. Another Census will leave none 
of the States existing or in Embryo, in the numerical rank of R.I. & 
Del, nor is it impossible, that the progressive assimilation of local 
Institutions, laws & manners, may[Volume 3, Page 557] overcome 
the prejudices of those particular States against an incorporation 
with their neighbours.
But with all possible abatements the present rule of voting 
for President by the H. of Reps. is so great a departure from the 
Republican principle of numerical equality, and even from the fed-
eral rule which qualifies the numerical by a State equality, and is 
so pregnant also with a mischievous tendency in practice, that an 
amendment of the Constitution on this point is justly called for by 
all its considerate & best friends.
I agree entirely with you in thinking that the election of Pres-
idential Electors by districts, is an amendment very proper to be 
brought forward at the same time with that relating to the eventual 
choice of President by the H. of Reps. The district mode was most-
ly, if not exclusively in view when the Constitution was framed and 
adopted; & was exchanged for the general ticket & the legislative 
election, as the only expedient for baffling the policy of the par-
ticular States which had set the example. A constitutional estab-
lishment of that mode will doubtless aid in reconciling the smaller 
States to the other change which they will regard as a concession 
on their part. And it may not be without a value in another import-
ant respect. The States when voting for President by general tick-
ets or by their Legislatures, are a string of beads; when they make 
their elections by districts, some of these differing in sentiment 
from others, and sympathizing with that of districts in other States, 
they are so knit together as to break the force of those geographical 
and other noxious parties which might render the repulsive too 
strong for the cohesive tendencies within the Political System.
It may be worthy of consideration whether in requiring elec-
tions by districts, a discretion might not be conveniently left with 
the States to allot two members to a single district. It would man-
ifestly be an important proviso, that no new arrangement of dis-
tricts should be made within a certain period previous to an ensu-
ing election of President.
Of the different remedies you propose for the failure of a 
majority of Electoral votes for any one Candidate, I like best that 
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which refers the final choice, to a joint vote of the two Houses 
of Congress, restricted to the two highest names on the Electoral 
lists. It might be a question, whether the three instead of the two 
highest names might not be put within the choice of Congress, 
inasmuch as it not unfrequently happens, that the Candidate third 
on the list of votes would in a question with either of the two first 
outvote him, and, consequently be the real preference of the vot-
ers. But this advantage of opening a wider door & a better chance 
to merit, may be outweighed by an increased difficulty in obtain-
ing a prompt & quiet decision by Congress with three candidates 
before them, supported by three parties, no one of them making a 
majority of the whole.
The mode which you seem to approve, of making a plurality 
of Electoral votes a definitive appointment would have the merit 
of avoiding the Legislative agency in appointing the Executive; but 
might it not, by multiplying hopes and chances, stimulate intrigue 
& exertion, as well as incur too great a risk of success to a very 
inferior candidate? Next to the propriety of having a President the 
real choice of a majority of his Constituents, it is desirable that he 
should inspire respect & acquiescence by qualifications not suffer-
ing too much by comparison.
I cannot but think also that there is a strong objection to un-
distinguishing votes for President & Vice President; the highest 
number appointing the former the next the latter. To say nothing 
of the different services (except in a rare contingency) which are to 
be performed by them, occasional transpositions would take place, 
violating equally the mutual consciousness of the individuals, & 
the public estimate of their comparative fitness.
Having thus made the remarks to which your communica-
tion led, with a frankness which I am sure you will not disapprove, 
whatever errors you may find in them, I will sketch for your con-
sideration a substitute which has occurred to myself for the faulty 
part of the Constitution in question
“The Electors to be chosen in districts, not more than two in 
any one district, and the arrangement of the districts not to be al-
terable within the period of ------ previous to the election of Pres-
ident. Each Elector to give two votes, one naming his first choice, 
the other his next choice. If there be a majority of all the votes on 
the first list for the same person, he of course to be President; if 
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not, and there be a majority, (which may well happen) on the other 
list for the same person, he then to be the final choice; if there be 
no such majority on either list, then a choice to be made by joint 
ballot of the two Houses of Congress, from the two names having 
the greatest number of votes on the two lists taken together.” Such 
a process would avoid the inconvenience of a second resort to the 
Electors; and furnish a double chance of avoiding an eventual re-
sort to Congress. The same process might be observed in electing 
the Vice President.
Your letter found me under some engagements which have 
retarded a compliance with its request, and may have also rendered 
my view of the subject presented in it more superficial than I have 
been aware. This consideration alone would justify my wish not to 
be brought into the public discussion. But there is another in the 
propensity of the Moment, to view everything, however abstract 
from the Presidential election in prospect, thro’ a medium con-
necting it with that question; a propensity the less to be excused as 
no previous change of the Constitution can be contemplated, and 
the more to be regretted, as opinions and commitments formed 
under its influence, may become settled obstacles at a practicable 
season.
 
Document 9
James Madison to John Hillhouse
from The Writings of James Madison. Edited by Gaillard Hunt. 9 vols. 
New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1900-1910.
Montpr 
May 1830.
Dear Sir
I have received your letter of the 10th inst: with the pamphlet con-
taining the proposed amendments of the Constitution of the U. 
States, on which you request my opinion & remarks.
Whatever pleasure might be felt in a fuller compliance with 
your request, I must avail myself of the pleas of the age I have 
reached, and of the controul of other engagements, for not ventur-
ing on more than the few observations suggested by a perusal of 
what you have submitted to the public.
I readily acknowledge the ingenuity which devised the plan 
you recommend, and the strength of reasoning [367] with which 
you support it. I cannot however but regard it as liable to the fol-
lowing remarks:
1. The first that occurs is, that the large States would not exchange 
the proportional agency they now have in the appointment of the 
Chief Magistrate, for a mode placing the largest & smallest States 
on a perfect equality in that cardinal transaction. N. York has in it, 
even now more than 13 times the weight of several of the States, 
and other States according to their magnitudes wd decide on the 
change with correspondent calculations & feelings.
The difficulty of reconciling the larger States to the equal-
ity in the Senate is known to have been the most threatning that 
was encountered in framing the Constitution. It is known also that 
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the powers committed to that body, comprehending, as they do, 
Legislative, Ex. & Judicial functions, was among the most serious 
objections, with many, to the adoption of the Constitution.
2. As the President elect would generally be without any previous 
evidence of national confidence, and have been in responsible re-
lations only to a particular State, there might be danger of State 
partialities, and a certainty of injurious suspicions of them.
3. Considering the ordinary composition of the Senate, and the 
number (in a little time nearly 50) out of which a single one was to 
be taken by pure chance; it must often happen, that the winner of 
the prize would want some of the qualities necessary to command 
the respect of the nation, and possibly be [368] marked with some 
of an opposite tendency. On a review of the composition of that 
Body thro’ the successive periods of its existence, (antecedent to 
the present which may be an exception) how often will names pres-
ent themselves, which would be seen with mortified feelings at the 
head of the nation. It might happen, it is true, that, in the choice of 
Senators, an eventual elevation to that important trust might pro-
duce more circumspection in the State Legislatures. But so remote 
a contingency could not be expected to have any great influence; 
besides that there might be States not furnishing at the time, char-
acters which would satisfy the pride and inspire the confidence of 
the States & of the People.
4. A President not appointed by the nation and without the weight 
derived from its selection & confidence, could not afford the ad-
vantage expected from the qualified negative on the act of the 
Legislative branch of the Govt. He might either shrink from the 
delicacy of such an interposition, or it might be overruled with too 
little hesitation by the body checked in its career.
5. In the vicissitudes of party, adverse views & feelings will exist be-
tween the Senate & President. Under the amendments proposed, 
a spirit of opposition in the former to the latter would probably 
be more frequent than heretofore. In such a state of things, how 
apt might the Senate be to embarrass the President, by refusing to 
concur in the removal of an obnoxious officer; how prone would be 
127
a refractory [369] officer, having powerful friends in the Senate, to 
take shelter under that authority, & bid defiance to the President; 
and, with such discord and anarchy in the Ex. Department, how 
impaired would be the security for a due execution of the Laws!
6. On the supposition that the above objection would be overbal-
anced by the advantage of reducing the power and the patronage 
now attached to the Presidential office; it has generally been ad-
mitted, that the Heads of Depts at least who are at once the as-
sociates & the organs of the Chief Magistrate, ought to be well 
disposed towards him, and not independent of him. What would 
be the situation of the President, and what might be the effect on 
the Executive business, if those immediately around him, and in 
daily consultation with him, could, however adverse to him in their 
feelings & their views, be fastened upon him, by a Senate disposed 
to take side with them? The harmony so expedient between the P. 
& Heads of Departments, and among the latter themselves, has 
been too liable to interruption under an organization apparently 
so well providing against it.
I am aware that some of these objections might be mitigated, if 
not removed; but not I suspect in a degree to render the proposed 
modification of the Executive Department an eligible substitute 
for the one existing. At the same time, I am duly sensible of the 
evils incident to the existing one, and that a solid improvement of 
it is a desideratum that ought to be welcomed by all enlightened 
patriots.
In the mean time, I cannot feel all the alarm you express at 
the prospect for the future as reflected from the mirror of the past. 
It will be a rare case that the Presidential contest will not issue in a 
choice that will not discredit the station, and not be acquiesced in 
by the unsuccessful party, foreseeing, as it must do, the appeal to 
be again made at no very distant day to the will of the nation. As 
long as the country shall be exempt from a military force powerful 
in itself and combined with a powerful faction, liberty & peace will 
find safeguards in the elective resource and the spirit of the people. 
The dangers which threaten our political system least remote are 
perhaps of other sorts and from other sources.
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I will only add to these remarks, what is indeed sufficiently 
evident, that they are too hasty & too crude for any other than a 
private, and that an indulgent eye.
Mrs. M. is highly gratified by your kind expressions towards 
her, & begs you to be assured that she still feels for you that affec-
tionate friendship with which you impressed her many years ago. 
Permit me to join her in best wishes for your health & every other 
happiness.
James Madison
May 1830 Montpellier
M. L. Hurlbert
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